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This dissertation examines how current targeted accountability and funding provisions un-
der federal guidelines impact the academic outcomes of the country’s more underserved popula-
tions.1 The first chapter demonstrates that accountability at the race level leads to increased reading
and math achievement for students. I investigate the impact of school-level accountability on racial
subgroups within a school, using a regression-discontinuity design with student-level Texas panel
data on third through eighth graders from 2004 through 2011. The targeted incentives increase
passing rates by 1-2 percentage points and the scores by .03 standard deviations in both math and
reading. These results persist for two to three years after intervention, but fade out by the fourth
year. Furthermore, students outside the targeted group are not hindered, with no effect on passing
rates and scores. A deeper analysis suggests that schools are not focusing on high-leverage stu-
dents but rather implementing wide-ranging interventions. I also find that the majority of gains are
due to gains among Black students, though it is not clear whether this is due to racial targeting.
1The research presented here utilizes confidential data from the State of Texas supplied by the Texas Education
Research Center (ERC) at The University of Texas at Austin. The author gratefully acknowledges the use of these
data. The conclusions of this research do not necessarily reflect the opinion or official position of the Texas Education
Research Center, the Texas Education Agency, the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board, the Texas Workforce
Commission, or the State of Texas. Any errors are attributable to the author.
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In the second chapter, I analyze the impact of federally designed and funded interventions
on student achievement, both of targeted students and non-targeted students. Under the No Child
Left Behind (NCLB) act of 2001, schools with less than 40% low-income students use federal Title
I funds for a Targeted Assistance Program, where schools above 40% are free to use those same
funds as general school money. This paper uses a fuzzy regression discontinuity design around
the 40% threshold with student-level Texas panel data on third through eighth graders from 2004
through 2011 to investigate. The evidence suggests that there is no difference in student outcomes,
on the whole or among subsamples, between the methods of using the federal funding.
The third chapter shows that the impact of Title I funding on student achievement is com-
plex, benefiting certain subgroups of students while impacting others negatively. I use an in-
strumental variable research design in order to estimate impacts while keeping external validity
through exploiting the large data set available, which includes student-level panel data on Texas
public school students from the years 2004 through 2011. While the instrument does not satisfy
the exclusion restriction in this case, with certain assumptions, the estimates are useful as lower
bounds on the true point estimates. Title I funding increases math passing rates by a minimum
of 3 percentage points and has an impact of equal to or greater than 0 on reading passing rates
and standardized scores for both math and reading. The IV estimates among elementary school
students are negative in both math and reading, while lower-performing and low-income middle
school students show large, though insignificant, effects of the funding on both math and reading
exams. Unfortunately, this study cannot speak to the impacts on older students due to a weak first
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Chapter 1
Targets of Opportunity: The Role of School-Specific Targeted
Incentives on Student Achievement
1.1 Introduction
Accountability systems have been prevalent in the US education sector since the mid 1990s,
and became federally mandated under No Child Left Behind in 2001. They are usually based on
passing rates of statewide tests, and are designed to give stakeholders more information as to
how each school and district is performing. By holding schools accountable for their results, the
process is thought to be transparent, increasing focus on student achievement. One other aim of
increased accountability is to close the achievement gap, as minority students have lagged behind
their peers in academic outcomes for decades. Indications are that this gap has increased recently,
but the reason is as of yet unknown. While there is a deep literature on the effects of increased
accountability, there is very little research on how specific, targeted accountability affects outcomes
for students. It is important to know whether targeting specific subpopulations can help increase
the achievement of the underperforming students in our schools. In this paper, I use a race-based
policy portion of No Child Left Behind to examine how added school-level incentives impact
student performance for both targeted and non-targeted students.
Lawmakers at all levels are currently attempting to frame the next big education initiative
to replace the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), after the staggered shutdown of
1
No Child Left Behind (NCLB) in the last year or two. The NCLB Act was enacted in order to
ensure all students achieved at acceptable levels, including minority and low-income students. The
theory behind the act was that if schools were simply assessed on how all their students were doing,
they would then rise to meet those standards, bringing up test scores of their lowest-performing
students to do so. The incentive structure of the policies bundled together under the act was such
that schools needed to increase the ratio of students passing each year and had to worry about the
students at the bottom of the distribution to meet the preset goals.
Increased accountability has had effects both in how schools run and their corresponding
results. States first started implementing their own accountability measures in the late 1990’s, al-
lowing researchers to use a difference-in-difference strategy to find impacts. In general, higher ac-
countability standards within states were found to increase test scores (Reback 2008, Hanushek and
Raymond 2005, Carnoy and Loeb 2002). The rollout of NCLB soon afterward gave us more evi-
dence that increased accountability leads to increased student achievement (Dee and Jacob 2011),
as well as evidence that parents respond to school performance when published (Hastings and
Weinstein 2007). There is also evidence that schools respond to these incentives by focusing on
students near the current performance standard (Neal and Schanzenbach 2010). It seems clear that
giving schools targets and attaching consequences to those targets changes school practice and
increases student performance.
The achievement gap in our education system has been persistent, and there is evidence
that it has grown over time (Bailey and Dynarski 2011, Reardon 2011). Minority and low-income
students have not performed up to the standard of their peers. Since the beginning of the movement
to resolve this educational inequity, a variety of policies and initiatives have been implemented to
attempt to solve the problem. They have ranged widely in their success, but the gap persists and
2
remains quite large. These efforts have included small scale initiatives aimed at students, state-level
policies, and nationwide legislation tying federal funds to school and district performance.
Little is known about the effects of targeting specific students with targets and conse-
quences and how this impacts student performance. No Child Left Behind is about general ac-
countability, but there are provisions that target specific groups of students in order to ensure
schools are not leaving anyone out. Kane and Staiger [2002b] posited that the NCLB subgroup
rules would have no effect on performance among minority youth, and Figlio et al. [2009] used
the Florida accountability system pre-NCLB to examine the question, confirming the earlier study.
However, the research using NCLB-era data to determine the impacts of these policies on students
is largely lacking.
With increased accountability and the incentive to focus on specific students comes the
question of how this impacts other students and whether there are trade-offs with such policies.
If schools are truly at full productivity, logic suggests there must be some such side-effect. To
date, the literature is inconclusive. Current research is based on what happens when a school fails
to meet AYP criteria. Students that are at the bottom of the distribution seem to gain more than
normal as schools focus on them, but how this impacts the other students is up for debate. Springer
[2008] and Ahn and Vigdor [2014] find no effect on other students, but Krieg [2011] finds that the
higher-performing students score lower than expected on subsequent tests. Because accountability
under NCLB is defined as the fraction of students passing in a school, it is important to understand
how this affects students who are not around the passing threshold for a given test, either far below
or far above.
This paper joins the literature on school accountability, but is one of few to examine the
impact of very specific incentives on student achievement. Prior research on targeted incentives in
3
schools uses data from the low accountability era before the advent of NCLB, using a difference-
in-difference strategy, as opposed to the regression discontinuity design featured in this paper. I
also add to the inconclusive literature on school trade-offs, through an examination of impacts on
specific types of students outside of the targeted subgroup. Furthermore, I am able to look at how
long the effects persist and whether the persistence varies by student achievement level.
The structure of the policy, in which subgroups that comprise more than 50 students and
10% of the student body qualify for AYP subgroup criteria, lends itself to a regression discontinuity
design. If one were to compare students in subgroups above and below the threshold, it would be a
comparison of students in very different settings. The optimal experiment would be one in which
incentives are randomized across schools, or across years within schools. To approximate this, I
use a regression discontinuity, comparing students in subgroups immediately below the threshold
to those immediately above the threshold. If the number of students right around the threshold is
truly idiosyncratic, this yields causal results. To examine those schools where incentives materially
change through the policy, I limit the sample to schools in which the subgroup in question is a
minority of the student population.
I find that students in targeted subgroups pass the math and reading exam at rates 1-2
percentage points higher than those in non-targeted subgroups. These students score .03 standard
deviations higher on the math and reading exams. There is no evidence that schools are focusing
on specific subsets of students by prior performance, such as those near the passing threshold. Nor
is there evidence that students in low-performing subgroups are impacted differently from those in
high-performing subgroups. However, I do find that Black students benefit more from treatment
than Hispanic or White students. Schools do not seem to be targeting specific students, so this
is likely due to student body composition across schools more than race-based targeting within
4
schools.
The increased achievement persists for several years after treatment. In math, the impact is
significant and positive for three years after treatment, with effect sizes of 1.84 percentage points
and .03 standard deviations three years later, but the impact fades out in year four. In reading,
the effect size is 1.06 percentage points and .02 standard deviations three years later, though the
estimated effect on scores is not significant at that point.
I also find no drop in achievement in science or social studies due to the increased incentives
for math and reading. Schools do not appear to be taking away instructional time from these non-
AYP subjects in response to the added incentives. Contrary to prior research, students not targeted
in these schools do not see a decrease in their performance levels. The effect sizes for both math and
reading in both passing rates and standardized scores are precise zeros, indicating that instructional
resources are not being taken from non-targeted students to boost the scores of targeted students.
The current policy debate, with the rolling back of NCLB after the lapse of the ESEA, is
about how much accountability is needed in the new education framework for the nation. This
paper and its findings give evidence that added incentives for schools lead to significant results for
students. The targeted students benefit, at no expense to the other students in the school, indicating
no presence of a trade-off. These results lead to the conclusion that accountability for schools
should increase, not decrease. Schools push to meet these targets, and increased achievement is
the result.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the policy whereby
the targeted incentives are applied to schools and Section 3 introduces the data and research design.
Section 4 presents estimates of the impact of the added incentives on the targeted and non-targeted
5
students, and Section 5 discusses the implications of these findings.
1.2 Institutional Background
The No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act of 2001 was aimed at improving the scores of
all students, but especially the scores of the traditionally under-performing groups. Basing school
Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) scores on an overall average left the potential for these subgroups
to continue performing poorly, masked by a larger population of higher-performing students. Thus,
there is a clause that states that schools are not only rated on the overall passing percentage, but that
of any qualifying subgroups: African American, White, or Hispanic students, as well as special
education students, Limited English Proficiency (LEP) students, and economically disadvantaged
students.
The application of No Child Left Behind varied across states. States were allowed to create
their own AYP passing standards by year, and with respect to the subgroup cutoff, were able to
define the specific number, as long as they were assessing proficiency of each of the defined groups.
Thus, while the cutoff for subgroup qualification varies by state, the general rule is applicable
across all states, and Texas’ policies do not differ much from the rest of the country.
In order to meet AYP in Texas, a school must pass a certain percentage of its students in
both math and reading. These percentages are designed to increase over time, hence the name.
The standards began at very low numbers in 2004, just 33% for math and 47% for reading, and
rose over time, to 75% in math and 80% in reading in 2011. (See Table A1 for more detail.) If
a school contains qualifying subgroups, each of those subgroups must also meet the AYP passing
standards. If any single qualifying subgroup does not perform up to standard, the school fails AYP
for that year.
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Qualification as a subgroup depends on the size of the school. For Texas schools with more
than 2,000 students, a subgroup must contain at least 200 students to qualify for AYP purposes.
For Texas schools with fewer than 2,000 students, a subgroup must contain at least 50 students and
10% of the student body to qualify for AYP purposes. A student may count for multiple subgroups,
i.e, Hispanic, LEP, and special education. If a subgroup does not have enough students to qualify
officially, those students’ scores still are part of the overall passing rate, but are not considered
separately.
Enrollment counts are taken on a specific October day each year, and determine to which
school students are allocated. To be counted, a student must be at the same school from the formal
October count date through the testing date in March or April. Students that transfer schools are
not counted for AYP purposes at either the new or former school.
For a subgroup to officially qualify, it must be comprised of at least 50 students and 10%
of the tested student body who have been enrolled from October through the testing date. Thus,
the count for analysis purposes could be taken as the amount of students enrolled in October who
test in April. However, in order to improve student achievement, schools need time to implement
an intervention, and must use some estimate of future testing counts earlier on in the year. It is
not clear how administrators go about making this prediction. For the purposes of this paper, I
use fall enrollment counts. These counts are officially done by the state, and are important to
administrators on a variety of levels, including funding, so they serve as the best proxy for school
administrators’ predictions. I plot the probability of official spring treatment as a function of fall
counts in Figure A1 for reference. As shown, it is very unlikely for a school just above the fall
threshold to qualify for spring treatment. However, it is administrator perception that matters in
planning out interventions moreso than the actual spring count.
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Sanctions begin after two consecutive years of not meeting the AYP standards and increase
in severity if a school continues to underperform. The first sanction requires that the underper-
forming schools give students the choice to transfer to other schools in the district. Later sanctions
include placement on a watch list and the implementation of a school improvement plan. By the
sixth consecutive year of missing the target, schools must undergo a complete restructuring. (See
Table A2, for more detail.) In addition to the official AYP sanctions, school administrators most
likely face consequences from district officials for continual underperformance.
1.3 Data & Research Design
My analysis is based upon data from the Texas Educational Resource Center (ERC), in-
cluding student-level demographic, attendance, and test score data. The demographic files contain
information on age, gender, free or reduced lunch status, ethnicity, special education status, En-
glish as a second language (ESL) status, limited English proficiency (LEP) status, and gifted and
talented status (GT). The attendance files contain information on enrollment for each student across
each school year, including if and when a student may have transferred mid-year.
The test score data is from the Texas Assessment of Knowledge and Skills (TAKS) exams,
developed by Pearson, and conducted in the springs of third grade through eleventh grade. Students
are tested in both math and reading every year, though in science, only in grades 5, 8, and 11, and
social studies, only in grades 8 and 11. Writing is the sole exam subject not fully consisting of
multiple choice questions and is assessed in grades 4 and 7. For the later years in the sample,
students in grades 5 and 8 are required to pass both the math exam and the reading exam in order
to be promoted, but have up to three attempts to do so. All public school students are required to
take the TAKS exams unless they have a severe disability. Those with moderate disabilities are
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given accommodations, but still take the exams. In my analysis, the test scores are normalized to
have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one for each grade and year across the entire Texas
sample.
Students were matched across these files both cross-sectionally and longitudinally using
de-identified student ID numbers. Using the fall enrollment dates and the testing dates, I then
constructed school-level variables, including gender, ethnicity, FRL, special education, ESL, LEP,
and gifted/talented ratios. These variables are used as additional controls throughout the analysis.
I also constructed a student count variable, both by race and overall school membership, for use
as the running variable. I construct separate count variables for fall and spring to examine their
differing effects.
Starting with all students in Texas that match across these files, a pooled cross-section
of 16,820,061 students, I drop any schools exempt from AYP considerations, leaving 16,446,768
students. I then pare the sample down to the most relevant students for analysis. The NCLB policy
mandates schools test students in grades 3-8 and one high school grade that states are free to
choose. To make the results more generalizable, I exclude high schools, leaving me with students
from elementary and middle schools tested in grades 3 through 8. This leaves 13,952,455 students.
Furthermore, I only include elementary and middle schools with more than 150 students.
This is so that the students in the analysis present a minority of the school population. Comparing a
subgroup of 49 students to one of 50 students will not matter if both schools have 60 total students
to begin with as the group matters too much to the overall passing ratio for the subgroup policy to
become relevant. This restriction leaves 13,370,364 students.
Due to the nature of a regression discontinuity design, I then restrict the sample to the
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relevant bandwidth; in this case, five. While I present basic results for bandwidth of ten, five,
and three, throughout the paper I continue using a bandwidth of five, following the process of
cross validation found in Imbens and Lemieux [2008]. Some rounding is applied due to the more
discrete nature of the running variable in this research design. The final sample includes 239,464
students across 4,821 campus by race by year groups. Further detail on sample size due to my
restrictions is available in Table A3. I also present results showing that my estimates are robust to
sample restrictions in Table A4.
I present both student-level and school-level summary statistics in Table1.1, both for the
relevant demographics and the baseline testing measures. As one might hope in an RD design,
both students and the schools they attend are similar, above and below the threshold. The student-
and school-level means are very close on either side of the threshold in both demographic charac-
teristics and baseline test scores.
1.3.1 Research Design
The purpose of this paper is to determine how schools react to extra incentives, and whether
this translates to student scores. Thus, I attempt to estimate the impact of subgroup qualification
on student test achievement. However, using ordinary least squares (OLS) most likely will not
give a causal effect of subgroup qualification on student outcomes due to the differences in school
composition between the treatement and control groups. For this reason, I use a regression discon-
tinuity approach to exploit the provision (described in detail earlier) whereby a subgroup’s scores
count for AYP if that subgroup has a minimum of 50 students and do not count if the subgroup
consists of fewer than 50 students.
The RD design, in this case, simply compares student outcomes in racial subgroups of
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more than 50 students to those of fewer than 50 students for White, Black, and Hispanic student
subgroups. With a large enough sample size, the comparison would be between subgroups with 49
students and subgroups with 50 students, but for precision, I expand the group to a bandwidth of
five rather than one. However, this allows for the possibility of a relationship between the number
of students in the subgroup and outcomes, so I control for the number of subgroup students with a
separate function on either side of the threshold.
In a perfect experiment, subgroup qualification would be randomized within the bandwidth
noted; another possibility is that treatment is randomly turned on and off for each subgroup within
a school over time. To approximate this second version, I use school by race fixed effects. This
also helps control for any long-standing performance differences between races within a school.
One might be concerned about how many “switchers” there are in the sample. A very small
amount would mean the results are based on a small sample of schools and not representative of
the population. However, the large majority of school by race clusters appear on either side of the
bandwidth over time, and thus the sample size is not a concern. I therefore estimate the following
equation to study the impact of subgroup qualification on student achievement:
yisrt = α+βQualrst+f(Countrst)+f(Countrst ∗Qualrst)+Xisrtpi+Zsrγ+Ttη+ isrt (1.1)
for student i in school s of race r in year t. Qual is an indicator of the student’s racial
subgroup qualification status, Count is a count of the number of students in the student’s racial
subgroup, X is a vector of student and school-level characteristics, Z is a vector of school x race
fixed effects, T is a vector of time fixed effects, and  is the error term. In the basic results, the
function of count on either side of the threshold is simply a linear spline, but a quadratic spline is
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used for a larger bandwidth in a separate specification. Estimates are clustered at the school x race
x year level, which is also the level of treatment.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Validity of Regression Discontinuity Design
The first assumption that must be satisfied under a regression discontinuity design is a lack
of manipulation of the running variable. Because there is no real advantage to having a subgroup
qualify for AYP criteria, there is an incentive for school administrators to manipulate the count
of students in a given race to ensure that the official count is a number less than 50. For this
paper, I use fall counts as the running variable, but the count that actually qualifies is the spring
count of students tested. I use fall counts because I believe that this is what administrators base
their educational decisions on for the purpose of increasing student test scores to meet the added
criterion. This gives them all year to intervene in one manner or another, and is generally a good
predictor of number of students tested in the spring.
To test for manipulation in the fall counts, I provide a visual in Figure 1.1, plotting the
distribution of the count of students in racial subgroups, using a quadratic specification on either
side of the threshold. Evidence of manipulation would be shown through a discontinuity in the
density around the cutoff. If there were manipulation, one might see a drop in the number of racial
subgroups with a qualifying count of 50 or 51, and a corresponding increase in the number with
counts of 48 or 49. As shown, such manipulation is not present. On the other hand, there is a small
and statistically significant jump in the number of subgroups with 50 students. However, because
there is no evidence that indicates an advantage to having a subgroup qualify, I believe there is no
manipulation of student counts around the threshold.
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However, there is another method by which manipulation is possible, whereby school ad-
ministrators take notice of the fall counts and take action to make sure that the spring testing counts
are below 50, thus disqualifying a racial subgroup from qualification. This could be done through
suspensions, or strategic student movement between campuses, or a variety of other methods. In
Figure 1.2, I plot the percent of students tested in the spring by the number of students in a sub-
group present in the fall. If this type of manipulation were happening, there would be a negative
discontinuity in the percent tested at the threshold. However, no such discontinuity appears. There
is no statistically significant discontinuity in either direction at the threshold, though the coefficient
would appear to be positive, if anything.
The second assumption is that the cutoff affects the students involved only through the
treatment; in this case, subgroup qualification. Thus, I check whether the students and the schools
the students attend are different on observable characteristics across the 50-student threshold. I
run the base specification without any controls with each of the student-level and school-level
covariates as an outcome. These are displayed in Figures A2 and A3, respectively. None of the
covariates shows a statistically significant discontinuity. )For more detail, see Panel A of Table A5
in the Appendix.) Note that the covariates included are those at the student level and those at the
school level. As another check, I do the same for prior year test scores for the sample of students
that were tested the previous year. The sample is smaller, of course, but none of the prior scores
or passing rates show a significant jump at the threshold, either. These results are also included in
the Appendix, in Panel B of Table A5. Due to the lack of discontinuities in either the student-level
covariates, school-level covariates, or baseline test scores, I am confident in the interpretation of
observed discontinuities at the 50 student threshold as due solely to the AYP qualification and not
due to sample composition on either side of the threshold.
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1.4.2 Impact of Subgroup Qualification on Students in Subgroup
The main results show that the targeted incentives have a positive impact on student achieve-
ment. Table 1.2 presents the basic results for the bandwidth of 5 students for both math and read-
ing, and Figures 1.3 and 1.4 presents the graphical evidence. Students in subgroups that qualify
for AYP status pass at a rate of 1.17 pp higher in math and 1.34 pp higher in reading, scoring about
0.03 standard deviations higher in both math and reading. In the basic sample, there are 239,464
students across 4,821 clusters at the race-by-year-by-campus level.
Table 1.3 presents the main coefficient for varying bandwidths, polynomial specifications,
and control variables for the math exam. Results are presented with a linear specification, with the
slope allowed to differ across the threshold, at bandwidths of three, five, and ten. A quadratic spec-
ification is presented at the bandwidth of ten. For all of these specifications, results are presented
with no controls, student demographics, student and school demographics, and all demographics
plus year fixed effects.
The coefficients for the math results are positive for both passing rates and scores across
all sixteen specifications. The impact sizes are similar among the three bottom rows, excluding
the model with a bandwidth of ten and a linear spline. Once all control variables are included, the
majority of the results across these three model types are significant at the 10% level. It seems that
the specification is not the driver of the results in this case.
Table 1.4 is organized in a similar manner. However, the coefficients are not as consistent
as those from the math exam. At a bandwidth of ten, regardless of the polynomial or the controls
included, the pass rate and score discontinuities are not significant, and in some cases, are actually
negative. However, when the model is restricted to a smaller bandwidth, the effect sizes and their
14
significance are remarkably similar. I am confident in the main result presented for both reading
pass rates and reading scores, as well as for the math results.
As stated earlier, I check for the robustness of my results to the sample restrictions in Table
A4, and show that the results do not vary much across samples. I also run the main specification
on various placebo thresholds, shown in Table A6, from 35 to 65 by fives, and show that 50 is the
unique threshold with significant and positive results.
The magnitude of the results, while positive and significant, is somewhat small. However,
the important piece is that schools are responding to these incentives, and that student scores are
increasing as a result. As long as schools are not losing sight of other students in the process, these
results are a signal that targeted incentives do help students.
1.4.3 Test Administration and Count Timing
As stated earlier, the count that determines subgroup qualification for AYP purposes is
actually the spring count of students tested. However, at that point it is too late for administrators
to intervene to improve student test scores if necessary. Thus, I use the fall student enrollment
count as the running variable through the analysis. However, in Table 1.5, I present results for
both fall and spring counts, as well as for the first and last test taken by students. These might
be different for various reasons: students moving in or out of the district, students transferring
between schools within the district, students being absent, etc.
In grades five and eight in the later years of the NCLB regime, students were required to
pass both the math and the reading exams in order to progress to the next grade1. They were given
1for more info, see http://tea.texas.gov/student.assessment/ssi/
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three chances to do so. Thus, some students took the test just once, while others took the test three
times. Administrators with subgroups including students in these grades might wait for the first
round of test results to come in before acting. If that is the case, we would expect to see a stronger
result using the last test for each student than using the first test.
For each outcome in the table, the first column shows the effect size using fall counts while
the second column shows the effect using spring counts. The results using the spring counts as the
running variable in Table 1.5 are insignificant for all outcomes measured, unlike the results using
fall counts. It seems that administrators use the fall counts as a predictor of spring counts and act
accordingly. This is logical, as the spring counts are unknown until the testing day, when it is too
late to intervene. Administrators possibly use more complex predictions, but it is clear from this
table that those predictions are much closer to the fall counts than to the spring counts.
The top row of the table shows effect sizes using the last test taken for each student within
a subject, while the bottom row shows effect sizes using the first test taken. Results using the first
test and those using the last test are not statistically different in any of the four outcomes. Thus, it
appears that any interventions implemented by school administrators are coming during the school
year, and are not ramped up after the first test results come back. This lack of action may be
because of the timing of the tests (each round is a month apart, and results take a couple weeks to
return), or may be because only a very small portion of students take a test more than once.
1.4.4 Impacts by Performance Levels
1.4.4.1 Students
Schools have quite a bit of information on each student for tested subjects. At a minimum,
they have grades and prior year test scores. Many schools benchmark students, giving a series of
16
tests aimed at mimicking the state exams as best as possible throughout the year in order to provide
a better picture of where each student is academically. Either way, schools have an adequate
picture of where each student stands in relation to the year-end exam. One might be interested,
then, in which students schools target during interventions implemented in order to improve racial
subgroup scores above the threshold.
The simplest intervention would be to give extra instruction to the lowest-performing stu-
dents. Because 83-89% of students pass the state exams, the lowest quartile would be the easiest
place to increase the passing rate, the only metric that matters in AYP calculations. Thus, in Table
1.6, I present basic results as well as results by quartile. I define quartiles by using each student’s
standardized state exam score the prior year. I then interact each quartile indicator with each in-
dependent variable, allowing all covariates to vary by quartile. The sample size is smaller in this
table because it excludes the first year of the sample, any third graders, and students who did not
sit for the exam the prior year, as they do not have prior year scores.
For this sample, the discontinuity in the math passing rate is 0.64 pp, while for reading it
is 1.56 pp. The discontinuities in score are 0.025 standard deviations for math and 0.039 standard
deviations for reading. These results are similar to those presented in Table 1.2. When examining
results by quartiles, there is absolutely no pattern among the math results. The jumps by quartile
are statistically similar, and I test for the equality of these four coefficients, showing the p-value
for these tests in the bottom of the table. For math, the p-values are 0.503 and 0.298 for passing
rates and scores, respectively, as expected. Among the reading results, it appears that the lower
two quartiles benefit the most, with passing rate jumps of 1.82 and 1.56 pp for the first and second
quartiles, respectively, and score jumps of 0.034 and 0.047. The p-values for equality of the four
coefficients, however, are very high. The evidence for interventions focusing on the first quartile
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is tenuous at best.
To double-check, I split the sample by number of questions each student was from passing
the previous year, and allow for the impact to vary across these subsamples. I present results in
Figures 1.5 and 1.6. Each point on the plots is sized according to the number of students within
the cell. There is no obvious pattern present in the plots for any of the four outcomes, other than
more students passing the exams than failing them the prior year.
These results seem to disqualify the hypothesis that school administrators would simply
focus on the lowest-performing students in order to increase the passing rate with the least amount
of inputs. The results persist across all quartiles, and are certainly not monotonically decreasing in
quartile. The question then remains as to what types of interventions are happening and if students
of all abilities are benefiting from the added incentive.
1.4.4.2 Subgroups
Similarly to schools intervening more for certain students, one would expect larger impacts
on subgroups around the passing threshold. If a racial subgroup the prior year all passed the exam
easily, then there is no incentive for a school to add in extra instruction or give tutoring. However,
if the subgroup the prior year performed very badly, then one might expect more interventions and
larger impacts. Only the subgroups in the lowest quartile are really in danger of failing to meet the
AYP standard.
I split the subgroups into quartiles by prior year’s performance in order to analyze whether
students in lower performing subgroups benefit more from the treatment. Results are presented in
Table A7. As before, the sample sizes are different from the basic results. If a new school opens,
there won’t be any scores from the prior year. There are very few of these instances, though.
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The results indicate the impact of the subgroup qualification does not vary by the sub-
group’s prior year performance. Effects may be stronger for the highest quartile, but the difference
across quartiles is not statistically different except for a marginal difference in effect sizes for math
scores, as I test for the equality of the coefficients. This is yet another insight into administra-
tor planning, and suggests that perhaps the interventions implemented are not focused, but rather
wide-ranging.
1.4.4.3 Rest of School
If the rest of the school performs extremely poorly, then there is no incentive to increase
scores for a particular subgroup. Even if that subgroup passes, the school won’t be meeting AYP
regardless. On the other hand, in schools where the rest of the school performs quite well, if only
one subgroup might hold them back, there is a large incentive to increase scores for those particular
students. To examine whether this is true, I split the subgroups into quartiles by the performance of
the rest of the school in the previous year and run the model for each quartile separately. (Results
are found in Table A8 of the Appendix.) I find that the effects differ across quartiles for math
scores, but not for any of the other three outcomes.
There are also many possibilities for the relationship between the subgroup in question and
the rest of the school that may make such analysis difficult. These two are likely highly correlated,
which means that subgroups in higher-performing schools may not be as low-achieving as their
counterparts in overall low-performing schools. They may already be achieving at levels above the
school passing threshold, and as such, no intervention would be necessary.
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1.4.5 Results by Race
Given that the results thus far suggest that treatment leads to some type of intervention, but
that the intervention impacts all students somewhat equally, without a focus on low-performing
students or subgroups, there is no reason to believe that students of any one race will benefit more
than those of another race. However, given the race-based impetus for the policy, it is prudent to
split the results by the three races included in the policy and analyze results.
In Figure 1.7, I present mean math passing rates and scores by fall count, split by race.
White students perform the best, then Hispanic students fall in the middle, with Black students
performing far below the other two. There is a positive impact on both passing rates and scores
for White students, while the impact for Hispanic students seems to be very small, if present at all.
However, the impacts on passing rates and scores for Black students is quite large, especially in
comparison to the other two. Figure 1.8 displays similar results for the reading exam, and shows
a very similar pattern. White student see a small positive impact, Hispanic students see almost no
impact, and Black students see a very large impact.
I formalize these results in Table 1.7. The first column for each outcome displays the joined
impact, while the second displays coefficients from a regression in which I interact race with each
covariate, allowing all coefficients to vary by race. The impacts across the four outcomes for Black
students are the only significant coefficients, but just as importantly, are much larger in magnitude.
On the math exam, the passing rate impact for Black students is 2.00 pp and the score impact
0.052 standard deviations, while the maximum of the other two races is 0.92 pp for passing rate
and 0.026 standard deviations for score. The gap isn’t quite as large for reading, but is still present.
Black students in the sample have lower test scores, and show the largest response to treat-
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ment. However, I have shown that schools are not targeting low-performing students or low-
performing subgroups. The larger response is most likely not due to race-based targeting within
schools. What, then, is driving this result? It is possible that, given the lower scores, school admin-
istrators see Black subgroups surpassing the qualification threshold as a bigger threat to AYP status
than other subgroups, and respond in kind. It is also possible that, for some reason, Black students
simply respond better to the interventions used in schools than the other students. Unfortunately,
it is not clear in this analysis exactly why the response is higher.
1.4.6 Long-Run Results
A natural question is whether the results presented persist past the year of treatment. The
math and reading tests from one grade to another cover some different material, but much of the
content is based on the same general objectives. Thus, even if there are long-run results, it is not
proof of true growth or any evidence that schools are not simply focusing on test-taking strategies.
Even such strategies could show persistent results.
In Panels A and B of Table 8, I present long-run results for achievement levels and achieve-
ment growth, respectively. I restrict the sample to students for whom testing data exists up to four
years after their subgroups are within the relevant bandwidth. This rules out any students from the
original sample who were in sixth grade or above or students from the years 2008 or later. In the
growth sample in Panel B, I further restrict to only students with a test score in the prior year. In
both panels, each coefficient presented is from a different regression, and includes a variable for
treatment in each year prior as well as treatment interaction terms. Thus, the coefficient presented
is for those students who have treatment in year zero, but not in any year afterward, as compared
to those without treatment in any year.
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In Panel A, there are positive long-run results, persisting three years out for math and
somewhere between two to three years out for reading. Students in qualified subgroups not only
achieve at higher levels in the year of treatment, their improvement continues for about three
years afterward, though the increased achievement fades over time. The increase in math passing
percentage varies a bit, but the other outcomes show more consistency. Math scores are increased
.040 standard deviations in the year of treatment, and decrease to .030 standard deviations three
years later, though still significant at the 10% level. Reading scores show a less consistent pattern,
where an increase of .036 standard deviations in the year of treatment declines to 0.019 one year
later and jumps back up to 0.036 standard deviations two years out. There are two possibilities for
how these higher achievement levels persist. The first is that schools keep the same interventions
used in the year of treatment for two to three years afterward, continuing to raise scores. The
second is that these students see a one-time increase in scores, and stay on that higher trajectory
for awhile afterward.
To differentiate between the two, I create the exact same table in Panel B, but for achieve-
ment growth rather than levels. If schools are continuing with the same successful interventions,
growth will be higher each year, whereas if it is more of a one-time increase in scores, there will
only be an increase in growth in year zero and not beyond. The second hypothesis is supported
quite strongly by the results from Panel B. In reading, there is achievement growth in the year of
treatment, and this fades out by one year later. In math, there appears to be a large jump two years
out that I cannot explain, but there is score growth in the year of treatment that falls to almost zero
one year later.
Student achievement is impacted strongly in the year of treatment, and the affected stu-
dents are shifted on to a higher learning curve through the school’s interventions. They stay on
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this higher curve for two to three years afterward. However, this is much more of an intercept
change than a slope change. Student test scores are not growing differentially beyond the year
of treatment, indicating that schools are not continuing interventions aimed at these students. As
before, curiosity remains as to which students benefit the most in the long-run. Are the students
most in need showing persistence over several years? I have run specifications on long-run results
by quartiles, but there are no discernible patterns as to which quartiles have more persistent or
stronger results.
1.4.7 Spillover Effects
1.4.7.1 Impacts on Students Outside Subgroup
Schools may intervene in order to increase passing rates of specific racial subgroups due to
increased pressure, but it is quite difficult to target only students of one race with an intervention.
More likely, either students are all given the intervention, or they grouped by performance and
targeted that way. Thus, results for other students could increase in tandem with those of the sub-
group in question. In Table 1.9, I present results on other students in the schools where subgroups
are in the bandwidth around the threshold. The sample sizes are much higher here, because I have
focused in general on subgroups that comprise a minority population in the school in question.
Because I constricted the sample to schools in which the treated subgroup is a minority, almost all
of the non-treated students are part of a qualified subgroup, but well above the threshold. For the
sample presented, the coefficients for all four outcomes are precise zeros and are not significant.
It is apparent that the schools do not take resources away from non-targeted students to focus on
the targeted students. Some schools may be using wider-ranging interventions, but perhaps not
enough to affect the overall effect sizes.
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In the second column for each outcome, I bin students into quartiles based on their prior
year exam scores and interact those indicators across all other independent variables. In math,
we see the largest results for the fourth quartile, with a pass rate increase of 0.76 pp and a score
increase of 0.024 standard deviations. The coefficients for the lower three quartiles are much
smaller. In reading, the first quartile students see a smaller effect than the other three, but there is
not a larger pattern at play. This lack of pattern again among the quartiles is fully in line with the
prior results. It would be strange for students outside the treated subgroup to have disparate impact
among quartiles if the treated subgroup students did not. Schools do not seem to be targeting any
specific academic group with interventions, and this holds for students outside of the subgroup as
well.
1.4.7.2 Impacts on Non-AYP Subjects
Students are tested in science in grades five and eight and in social studies in grade eight.
These exam scores are not considered for school AYP consideration nor for student progression.
However, these subjects use elements of math and reading, and if students have truly grown in those
subjects, they might be expected to perform better on these tests as well. In Table 1.10, I present
these results. On the science exam, the passing rate coefficient is -0.18, though not significant,
and the score coefficient is an insignificant -0.015. In social studies, the pass rate coefficient is an
insignificant 1.21 and the score coefficient is 0.006 standard deviations. The standard errors for
these results are quite high compared to the prior results due to the much smaller sample sizes.
There does not appear to be any effect on test scores in these non-incentivized subjects. This could
be because any score growth due to growth in reading and math is outweighed by time taken away




Closing the achievement gap is one of the principle aims of the No Child Left Behind
legislation. One of the main components to do so is the use of subgroup incentives within schools.
However, the research on the effectiveness of these incentives is lacking. There has been plentiful
research into how general accountability affects students, but the effects of targeted accountability
incentives are unclear. Furthermore, the progress in closing the achievement gap has been slow,
and information on policies that may help would be useful.
Added race-based incentives increase academic achievement on both math and reading
scores, both in the passing rate and the actual scores. This added achievement does not seem to be
concentrated among lower-performing students, nor among lower-performing racial groups, nor
even among the lower-performing schools. It is concentrated among Black students, as opposed
to White or Hispanic students. The effects persist throughout all populations, independent of prior
performance. These effects are not only present in the treatment year, but persist for two to three
years afterward, even if the incentives do not persist due to a falling student count for the race in
question. Increased performance in the treatment group does not come at the expense of students
outside of the treatment group, with the non-targeted students showing no effect.
The natural question arises as to what schools are doing in order to achieve these results.
The simplest type of intervention to raise the passing rate for the treated group of students would be
to focus on the lowest-achieving students, in the form of extra instruction or small group tutoring.
However, this is not borne out in the results, where the highest performing students show similar
achievement increases to the lowest-performing students. Also, schools cannot plausibly focus on
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one race of students, even if that is where the incentive lies. Because of the broad range of students
and schools where positive results are shown, it seems that any intervention implemented is at a
school-wide level. The long-run achievement growth results show that these interventions do not
persist past the year of treatment. The fact that effects based on fall student counts are significant
and positive, while those based on spring student counts are statistically zero, lends credence to
this well. As to what these larger academic changes are, this paper does not have any methods
for deciphering. Perhaps schools are simply adding more instructional time in math and reading,
a common instructional intervention. In the future, it may be worth investigating what strategies
were used, perhaps to determine how to further promote effective treatments.
Schools are responding to race-based incentives with some type of change that increases
student test scores, regardless of prior individual or school performance. If schools were at full
productivity, we would expect to see a drop in the achievement of other students in the school.
However, instead we see no change in reading and math scores for the other students. This indicates
that schools are not operating at full productivity, and that these incentives perhaps push them in
that direction, making them a useful policy lever.
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Tables & Figures
Table 1.1: Summary Stats
Student-Level School-level
Below Threshold Above Threshold Below Threshold Above Threshold
Demographic Variables
Ratio Male 0.503 0.503 0.512 0.512
(0.500) (0.500) (0.031) (0.031)
Ratio FRL 0.569 0.575 0.525 0.539
(0.495) (0.494) (0.259) (0.250)
Ratio Special Education 0.084 0.081 0.114 0.114
(0.277) (0.273) (0.042) (0.044)
Ratio ESL 0.096 0.097 0.061 0.063
(0.432) (0.434) (0.071) (0.073)
Ratio Gifted 0.082 0.083 0.093 0.090
(0.267) (0.273) (0.097) (0.088)
Ratio Black 0.420 0.401 0.161 0.172
(0.494) (0.490) (0.156) (0.161)
Ratio Hispanic 0.351 0.354 0.367 0.375
(0.477) (0.478) (0.250) (0.238)
Ratio White 0.229 0.245 0.423 0.407
(0.420) (0.430) (0.265) (0.254)
N 104,615 134,849 2,124 2,457
Baseline Scores
Math Pass Ratio 0.820 0.817 0.805 0.813
(0.384) (0.387) (0.396) (0.390)
Standardized Math Score -0.077 -0.089 -0.086 -0.099
(0.994) (1.002) (0.398) (0.397)
Reading Pass Ratio 0.886 0.883 0.877 0.882
(0.318) (0.322) (0.328) (0.323)
Standardized Reading Score -0.014 -0.026 -0.029 -0.040
(0.974) (0.983) (0.356) (0.354)
N 73,068 94,184 2,110 2,439
Notes: Below the threshold refers to students in subgroups or schools with subgroups with 45-49 students,
while above the threshold refers to students in subgroups or schools with subgroups with 50-54 students.
Statistics displayed are the mean, and below each mean, the standard deviation in parentheses.
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Table 1.2: Basic Results
Math Reading
Pass % Score Pass % Score
Subgroup Qualifies 1.17** 0.032*** 1.34*** 0.034***
(0.50) (0.012) (0.36) (0.010)
Student demographics X X X X
School demographics X X X X
Year FE X X X X
N 239,464 239,464 239,464 239,464
rˆ2 0.177 0.325 0.128 0.302
Mean 82.16 -0.084 89.00 -0.020
Clusters 4,821 4,821 4,821 4,821
Notes: Each column is from a separate regression with a linear
function of the count on each side of the threshold, allowing the
slope to vary on either side. All regressions include year, grade,
and school-by-race fixed effects, gender, race, FRL status, special
education status, and LEP status at the student level, as well as gen-
der, FRL, special education, LEP, and student count at the school
level.
*** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.8: Long-Run Results
Panel A: Achievement Levels
Math Reading
Pass Score Pass Score
Current Year 2.14*** 0.040** 1.21** 0.036**
(0.70) (0.018) (0.50) (0.015)
+1 Year 1.51** 0.038** 1.24** 0.019
(0.65) (0.018) (0.55) (0.016)
+2 Years 3.02*** 0.040** 0.93* 0.036**
(0.71) (0.017) (0.53) (0.015
+3 Years 1.84** 0.030* 1.06* 0.021
(0.76) (0.016) (0.61) (0.015)
+4 Years 0.14 0.001 -0.51 0.014
(0.81) (0.016) (0.59) (0.014)
N 98,519 98,519 98,519 98,519
Clusters 3,263 3,263 3,263 3,263
Panel B: Achievement Growth
Math Reading
Pass Score Pass Score
Current Year 0.89 0.036* 1.68** 0.038**
(0.80) (0.019) (0.76) (0.019)
+1 Year -0.21 0.008 0.97 0.016
(0.81) (0.020) (0.63) (0.018)
+2 Years 3.04*** 0.035* 0.18 0.006
(0.97) (0.018) (0.72) (0.018)
+3 Years 0.08 -0.010 0.96 0.012
(0.96) (0.017) (0.77) (0.016)
+4 Years -0.49 -0.025 -0.56 0.009
(0.94) (0.017) (0.63) (0.015)
N 52,160 52,160 52,160 52,160
Clusters 2,845 2,845 2,845 2,845
Notes: Each result is from a separate regression with a linear function of the count on each side of the threshold,
allowing the slope to vary on either side. All regressions include year, grade, and school-by-race fixed effects,
gender, race, FRL status, special education status, and LEP status at the student level, as well as gender, FRL,
special education, LEP, and student count at the school level. Each model in Panel B also includes the prior year’s
corresponding subject exam score. The sample in this table is restricted to students with a score in the year prior
to the year of treatment and the four years following the treatment year.
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.10: Spillover Effects on Non-AYP Subjects
Science Social Studies
Pass Score Pass Score
Subgroup Qualifies -0.18 -0.015 1.21 0.006
(0.87) (0.019) (1.22) (0.036)
Mean 75.13 -0.049 89.54 -0.033
N 67,134 67,134 22,126 22,126
Clusters 4,001 4,0001 998 998
Notes: Each column is from a separate regression with a linear function of the count on each
side of the threshold, allowing the slope to vary on either side. All regressions include year,
grade, and school-by-race fixed effects, gender, race, FRL status, special education status, and
LEP status at the student level, as well as gender, FRL, special education, LEP, and student
count at the school level.
*** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Figure 1.1: Check for Manipulation of Counts
Notes: The figure shows the amount of race x school subgroups at each distance from the
threshold, along with a fitted quadratic function on each side of the threshold.
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Figure 1.2: Student Test Rates as a Function of Subgroup Count
Notes: The figure shows the percentage of students tested at each distance from the threshold
along with the predicted values generated by the default regression specification described in
the text.
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Figure 1.3: Passing Rates
Notes: The figure shows the mean passing rate by the distance from the threshold, as well as
the predicted values generated by the default regression specification described in the text.
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Figure 1.4: Scores
Notes: The figure shows the mean standardized score by the distance from the threshold, as
well as the predicted values generated by the default regression specification described in the
text.
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Figure 1.5: Math Impacts by Distance From Passing Previous Year
Notes: The figures above display the mean impacts when the sample is split by the distance
each student was from passing the previous year. The data points are weighted by the number
of students within each cell.
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Figure 1.6: Reading Impacts by Distance From Passing Previous Year
Notes: The figures above display the mean impacts when the sample is split by the distance
each student was from passing the previous year. The data points are weighted by the number
of students within each cell.
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Figure 1.7: Math Impacts by Race
Notes: The figures above show results when running the main specification with each covariate
interacted with race indicators. For formal results, see Table 1.7.
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Figure 1.8: Reading Impacts by Race
Notes: The figures above show results when running the main specification with each covariate
interacted with race indicators. For formal results, see Table 1.7.
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Chapter 2
Teacher Knows Best? A Study on Interventions for At-Risk
Students
2.1 Introduction
It has been established that low-income and minority students lag behind their better off
peers in academic achievement using various metrics, such as test scores and completion rates at
different levels. According to Reardon [2011], the test score gap is 30 to 40% wider than it was
a mere 25 years ago. Bailey and Dynarski [2011] find that there are growing inequality gaps in
college entry, persistence, and graduation. Even though the achievement gap has been studied in
detail in the past years, the gap has not begun to close, per Hemphill and Vanneman [2011]. Given
that the minority share of the population in the United States is growing, this issue figures to remain
important for the foreseeable future.
The federal government gives school districts extra funding for low-income students under
Title I, Part A in order to help school districts raise the achievement of these students. For schools
with lower concentrations of low-income students, this money comes with strict guidelines for
how it is to be used. However, in schools with higher concentrations of low-income students, this
money can be treated as part of a school’s general funds. While the money per student is similar, the
treatment of these at-risk students varies between these two programs, called a Targeted Assistance
Program (TAP) and a Schoolwide Program (SWP), respectively. In a TAP, at-risk students are
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targeted by specific interventions. In a SWP, at-risk students are considered as simply a part of
the general population, and the school may or may not use interventions of its own design. These
programs are described more in Section 2.1.
In this paper, I examine whether funding set aside for a specific purpose helps to achieve
that purpose in schools. To do so, I identify the causal effect of schoolwide programs on the aca-
demic achievement of both at-risk and non at-risk students using quasi-experimental variation in
the program provision generated by the Title I policy that dictates school program provision. Un-
der the policy (most recently updated in No Child Left Behind, 2001), schools with a low-income
population of less than 40% must use a Targeted Assistance Program, while those with concentra-
tions at or above 40% may use a Schoolwide Program. This suggests a regression discontinuity
design (RDD) in which I compare students in schools immediately above the threshold to stu-
dents in schools immediately below the threshold in order to obtain the difference in outcomes
between schools implementing Schoolwide Programs as opposed to those implementing Targeted
Assistance Programs. I give more details on this strategy in Section 5.
This paper adds to the literature evaluating the effects school funding (described in Section
2.2) in three ways. First, it addresses how the money is used in schools, rather than simply extra
money to assist with disadvantaged students. Even if papers studying the effect of additional
money in schools show results, the mechanism for these results is not clear. In this paper, the
money does not vary across treatments, but the interventions used for at-risk students do vary.
Thus, I study slightly more of the actual practices within schools, rather than simply the broad
financial inputs and academic outputs. Secondly, this paper evaluates whether money set aside
for a specific purpose in schools achieves that purpose. Most school funding is general purpose,
and often targeted funding is given for boutique interests. In this case, the targeted funding is
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aimed at a large and under-performing student population. Thirdly, the previous papers use a
regression discontinuity design at a much lower threshold of low-income students. This paper uses
a threshold much closer to the median concentration of low-income students across public schools
in the United States, and thus is generalizable to a broader range of schools than the previous
research. Earlier papers focusing on schools on the threshold for receiving Title I money are
observing schools on one end of the poverty distribution. As the majority of schools have growing
concentrations of low-income students, the median concentration is likely to grow, making this
earlier research even less applicable.
I implement my empirical strategy using data from the Educational Resource Center (ERC)
at the University of Texas at Austin. While this data is described in more detail in Section 4, I use
reading and math test scores for students from third grade through eleventh grade between 2004
and 2011 as outcomes. I use the student-level demographic data to construct school concentrations
of low-income students.
To preview the results in Section 5, I find an increase of about 17% in the likelihood of a
school offering a schoolwide program at the threshold, but do not find many significant changes in
school- or student-level covariates at the threshold. The distribution is smooth across the threshold
as well. I use this increase in school provision of a SWP as an instrumental variable to identify
the causal effect of SWP provision on student achievement. The use of an instrumental variable
provides estimates of the local average treatment effect of these programs in schools where the
provision of a SWP or TAP is completely governed by the policy.
The findings show no impact at all of the provision of a schoolwide program on student
test scores. This holds for all students, as well as for low-income and non-low-income students
separately. There is no pattern when splitting students by quartiles, either. The lack of significant
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impacts persists across multiple bandwidths and polynomial degrees, showing that this lack of im-
pact is not due to a specification choice. This may be due to a smaller-than-expected discontinuity
in the first stage, but more likely is indicative of the true impact of the program, given the small
point estimates and standard errors.
2.2 Background and related literature
2.2.1 Legislative background
Title 1 was originally signed by Lyndon B. Johnson in 1965 as part of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act (ESEA) (Pub. L. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27, 20 U.S.C. ch. 70). Since 1965, it
has been the largest source of federal government funding for K-12 education. In 2011, more than
$14 billion of federal spending was allocated to Title I, and currently more than 50% of public
schools receive public funding. Titled “Better Schooling for Educationally Deprived Children”,
its purpose was to give financial assistance to local educational agencies with high amounts of
low-income children. The thought was that these students, being low-income themselves, who
attended schools with other low-income students, had a much more difficult path to success than
their educational peers.
There are many guidelines on how funding may be used at a particular school. For schools
with high concentrations of low-income students, they may use the money for schoolwide pro-
grams (SWPs). The threshold for determining whether a high concentration existed was originally
set in 1975 at 75%, meaning that schools with a student body composed of more than 75% low-
income students could use the money as general funding. In 1994, Improving America’s Schools
Act (IASA) added standards to assess student progress and, more importantly for this paper, re-
duced the schoolwide program threshold to 50%. In 2001, No Child Left Behind (NCLB) lowered
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this threshold once again to 40%, along with other changes like mandating yearly standardized
tests and adding in an Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) indicator.
For a school to qualify for a schoolwide program, they must meet the threshold for eli-
gibility and then apply. The application process takes a year, during which the school submits a
comprehensive plan for the use of the funding to improve instruction at the school. This is impor-
tant because it is actually the previous year’s low-income student count that indicates eligibility.
The funds can only be used to supplement funds available from non-federal sources, and cannot
be used to replace other funding. Thus, results are not due to any crowding-out effect. The pro-
gram must promote schoolwide reform and upgrade the entire educational operation of the campus.
Lastly, once a school becomes eligible, the school keeps its eligibility, as long as it is eligible for
Title I, Part A funds, which is a lower threshold. Given that most schools have seen a rise in
poverty, this is not often an issue. It is also important to note that the threshold for schoolwide
program eligibility does not have anything to do with the amount of funding for a school, only how
that funding may be used.
Schools below the threshold for schoolwide program eligibility must use the funding for
Targeted Assistance Programs (TAPs). These programs meet the intent and purpose of Title I
if they serve only students failing or most at risk of failing and provide supplementary services
designed to meet the needs of the students in the program. Schools must maintain records that
document that the Title I, Part A funds are spent on activities and services for only Title I, Part
A children (those failing or most at-risk of failing). Targeted Assistance Programs include many
items, such as extended learning to allow at-risk students to catch up with grade level peers. These
include an extended school year, before- and after-school programs, or summer program oppor-
tunities. They may include small group pull-outs or tutoring before, during, or after school. The
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funding may also be used to pay for paraprofessionals in classrooms containing mostly at-risk
students, such as remedial classes, or to pay for extra instruction taught by a designated Title I
teacher. The important consideration is that the funds are targeted toward at-risk students and not
the general population.
2.2.2 Related Literature
There is a substantial body of literature on the relationship between funding and student
performance, and many of these papers are on the use of Title I funding to supplement funding for
schools with high concentrations of low-income students. However, the majority of this research
is on the effect of receiving the extra money and not how it is used. Both Card and Payne [2002]
and Gordon [2004] examine the effects of extra funding from the state and the federal government,
respectively. Gordon finds that federal funding is completely crowded out within three years, but
Card and Payne find that state funding actually increases district spending. More importantly, they
show evidence that equalization of spending across districts narrows the gap in test score outcomes
between income groups. This paper does not explicitly address Title I Part A funding, but more
recent research does.
Van der Klaauw [2008] uses data from New York City public schools from 1993, 1997, and
2001 to look at schools directly above and below the threshold for Title I funding. Because he has
data from a specific school district with explicit eligibility rules, he can exploit the discontinuity at
the eligibility threshold, which in this case was the average poverty level across the district. Using
an RD design, he finds that Title I funding was ineffective at raising student performance, and ac-
tually finds negative estimates in the first two samples. He considers multiple outcomes, including
grade retention, suspension, school attendance, student mobility rates, and a set of reading and
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math test scores. Matsudaira et al. [2012] perform a very similar analysis to Van der Klaauw in a
large urban school district. The authors also use an RD design on the within-district threshold for
eligibility for Title I funds. However, they first look at how much that eligibility impacts funding
for schools, finding that it raises federal revenue by about $460 per student, but only raises edu-
cation spending by $360 per student. They find no impact on overall school-level test scores as
well as no impact on those subgroups most targeted by Title I funding. They also find that Title I
eligibility results in no significant increase in total direct expenditures because such small amounts
of money are involved compared to the state and local funding. While more detailed than Van der
Klaauw’s analysis, the methodology and results are exactly the same. The authors in these papers
use a regression discontinuity approach around the threshold for Title I funding, examining the
effect of giving more money to schools on academic outcomes.
Outside of the United States, Leuven et al. [2007] look at the effects of two different sub-
sidies for primary schools with sharp cutoffs at a threshold of 70% disadvantaged students. One
subsidy is aimed at extra funding for personnel, while the other is used for technology. They
use a modified regression discontinuity (RD) design [Hahn et al., 2008], which in this case is a
difference-in-difference with a narrow bandwidth around the threshold of 70%. They actually find
negative point estimates, and that the extra technology funding is especially detrimental to girls’
achievement. The personnel estimates are explained by suggesting that the schools above the
threshold already had sufficient personnel, and that more educators had a very low marginal value.
Ooghe [2011] examines a program similar to Title I in Belgium using both regression discontinu-
ity and difference-in-difference, finding positive effects for mathematics, reading, and spelling, but
only significant effects for spelling. He finds somewhat larger effects for disadvantaged students
and smaller effects for lower initial performers.
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Thus far, the literature has been focused on finding a relationship between extra funding for
disadvantaged students and their academic outcomes. However, in this paper I use strings attached
to Title I funding to examine how school choice in the use of supplementary federal funds affects
both disadvantaged and non-disadvantaged students. There is a small, non-causal body of research
on this topic (Wong and Meyer [1998], Sunderman [2001], Boland et al. are some examples), but
these are almost entirely qualitative in nature and do not attempt to quantify causal effects. In this
paper, I use a threshold of 40% low-income students, while previous research is based around a
much lower threshold. This paper will be about schools much closer to the typical public school in
the US, which has a student body with about 50-55% low-income students. Furthermore, earlier
papers observe the school as a ”black box”, only observing what goes in and what comes out. In
this paper, I attempt to at least subdivide the larger black box into two smaller black boxes inside
the school and observe how a specific mechanism impacts students differentially.
2.3 Empirical strategy
2.3.1 Conceptual framework
The direction of the impact of targeted assistance programs (as compared to schoolwide
programs) on student achievement is theoretically ambiguous for at-risk students, and positive for
non at-risk students. The ambiguity for at-risk students is due to the differences between the three
channels through which targeted assistance programs differ from schoolwide programs: dedicated
staff increases, student pull-outs during the school day, and student pull-outs outside the regular
school day or year. For one, the quality of the new staff dedicated to the at-risk students may suffer.
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, there is an increased probability of tracking due to the
targeted interventions.
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I switch terminology often between at-risk and free-or-reduced lunch (FRL) status because
schools decide how to divide students into these two groups based on academic measures. While
this may not be exactly aligned with income, this data is not available, and thus I am using FRL
status as a highly correlated indicator.
Dedicated staff increases and mid-day student pull-outs work similarly. Dedicated staff
increases mean that there are classes full of at-risk students taught by Title I teachers, while mid-
day student pull-outs are usually groups of at-risk students being pulled out of class to be taught by
a Title I paraprofessional or teacher. These dedicated staff members are brought on for a full year
at a time, just like any other staff member. However, even for the Title I teachers, one might posit
that they are of lower quality than already established classroom teachers, for one of two reasons:
They would already be hired if they were of higher quality, and most often the least experienced,
newest teachers are given these classrooms full of at-risk students. The paraprofessionals are not
teachers, though for pull-outs they will effectively become so. In either case, the at-risk students
are learning from staff members of lower quality than they would under a schoolwide program.
This would cause their test scores to suffer, but they are also learning in smaller groups, which
might mitigate this effect somewhat.
In either of these situations, there will be increased tracking of students, which might out-
weigh effects by any other channel. By forcing schools to dedicate staff solely to at-risk students,
the guidelines mean that there will be classrooms or pull-out groups full of at-risk students who are
achieving poorly academically. When this happens, the non at-risk students will also be grouped.
The TAP effectively mandates that schools track students academically. For the non at-risk stu-
dents, it seems logical that this can only improve their scores. For the at-risk students, this may
help them academically due to teaching more focused on their needs, but may hurt them moreso
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due to behavioral concerns and peer effects. They also might not get any more of the teacher’s
time individually, due to there being more students needy of that time.
The one intervention that should have clear, unambiguous effects is student pull-outs out-
side of the normal school day or school year. At-risk students are given tutoring or summer school
on top of their normal classes. This should have only positive impacts on academic outcomes, as
it supplements rather than supplants normal classroom instruction.
The percentage of low-income students in a school most often increases over time, so it is
more useful to think of the outcomes in this fashion. As schools move from targeted assistance
programs to schoolwide programs, the effects are most likely negative for the non at-risk students,
who benefit from the tracking inherent in the targeted assistance programs. However, for at-risk
students, the effects are much less clear. They benefit from supplemental instruction outside of the
normal school day or year, but the effect of dedicated staff could go either way. They might benefit
from smaller, more focused instruction, but the composition of these classes or small groups might
hurt them through peer effects.
2.3.2 Identification strategy
Due to the difficulty in predicting how moving from a targeted assistance program to a
schoolwide program will impact students academically, an empirical framework is necessary. I
want to estimate the impact of schoolwide programs on achievement (among Title I schools), for
which the following equation would be used:
yist = α + ωYist−1 + βSWPst + δFRList + piXist + γZst + ist (2.1)
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for student i in school s in year t. y is an academic measure, SWP is an indicator for the school
having a schoolwide program, X is a set of student characteristics including FRL status, Z is
a set of school characteristics, and  is the error term. The parameter of interest is β, which
should measure how income students are impacted by schoolwide programs. However, schools
using schoolwide programs have a higher percentage of low-income students, who score lower
academically, on average. Thus, one cannot interpret the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate of
β as a causal effect of schoolwide programs. Due to the compositional differences, these schools
would most likely have lower test scores regardless of the presence of a schoolwide program. To
address this issue, I use a regression discontinuity approach based on the policy rule determining
which schools are eligible to run schoolwide programs. Under this provision of NCLB, schools
are allowed to apply for schoolwide program use when their student body is greater than or equal
to 40% low-income. Once they have a schoolwide program in place, they may keep even if they
fall below the threshold, but this rarely happens in practice.
I will essentially be comparing student outcomes for both groups in schools immediately
above the 40% threshold to those immediately below it. It is unlikely that these schools differ
much, but due to the policy rule, only those above the 40% threshold are allowed to offer the
schoolwide program, while those below it are mandated to use a targeted assistance program.
While I would like to examine only those schools in a very narrow bandwidth, for precision I
expand the bandwidth around the threshold. As stated before, there is a relationship between the
percentage of FRL students and academic outcomes, so I must control for this at the school level.
Therefore, I estimate the following first-stage equation to study the impact of the policy on the
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for school s in year t. FRL% is the school percentage of FRL students andAbove40 is an indicator
for the percentage being equal to or greater than 40. Because it takes a year to apply for a school-
wide program and schools cannot lose the program once they have it, I actually use the following
for FRL% : FRL%st = max{FRL%s2001,FRL%s2002, FRL%s(t−2), FRL%s(t−1)}. I find that
δFSis positive and statistically significant, showing that some schools that otherwise would have
had targeted assistance programs were induced to move to schoolwide programs. I then instrument
the endogenous regressor in equation (1), SWP , with Above40. Xin equation (1) contains, XFS ,
f(FRL%),and f(FRL%) ∗ Above40. This is following a standard fuzzy regression discontinuity
framework Imbens and Lemieux [2008], and yields a causal estimate of β. Equation (2) is the
first-stage question associated with the 2SLS estimation of equation (1).
Below I also report the results of estimating the reduced-form equation,
yist = α
RF+ωYist−1+f(FRL%st)+δ
RFAbove40st+f(FRL%st)∗Above40+piRFXRFist +γRFZRFst +RFist .
(2.3)
This reduced-form equation estimates the effect of being just above the 40% cutoff, δRF , on
achievement. However, to obtain the effect of schoolwide programs on achievement, I rescale
this reduced-form effect, equivalent to the 2SLS estimation of β. In yet a further specification to
find differential impacts of the policy on FRL students and non-FRL students, I allow both the dis-
continuity the functions on either side of the threshold to vary by FRL status, allowing for different
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coefficients for the two groups of students.
The fuzzy RD strategy identifies the local average treatment effect (LATE) for schools
close to the 40% cutoff. These schools are not far off the mean for % FRL students by school in
the United States, at around 50% (in 2010). Thus, the schools used for identification in this paper
can be thought of as characteristic of generic public schools. However, due to the choice inherent in
the policy, identification of compliers is more complicated. Schools do not have to apply once they
cross the threshold; they may stay with their targeted assistance program if administrators choose
to do so. The results identified in this paper are based on schools that are above the threshold and
have chosen to apply. There are two possibilities for which schools these are: 1) schools in which
the administrators believe that they can provide better interventions for at-risk students than those
prescribed by the targeted assistance program, or 2) schools in which the administrators believe a
schoolwide program is simply easier to administer than the targeted assistance program. However,
due to the length and difficulty of the application process, there is a deterrent to those schools trying
to switch over simply for ease of administration. Therefore, I believe that the effects identified are
from those schools in which administrators believe their own interventions are better than those
mandated by a TAP. However, there is no data on which interventions are used in the schools that
have a SWP, so the reader should think of the identified effects as the effect of allowing schools
choice in how they help their at-risk students in place of specific programs within the targeted
assistance programs. This paper speaks, in that respect, to the issue of local versus federal control
of school practices. In a SWP, schools have control over how to use the money, and in a TAP, the
government mandates specific interventions to be used with the money given.
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2.4 Data
The data used for implementation come from the Texas Education Resource Center (ERC)
at the University of Texas at Austin. At the student level, the data contains demographics, school
information, and reading and math test scores from the end-of-year exams called the Texas As-
sessment of Knowledge and Skills (TAKS). Using the student information, I construct a ratio for
low-income students for each year. Because the application process takes ones year, I lag this ratio.
The minimum threshold for a schoolwide program changed with the passage of NCLB in 2001,
so I use data from 2001 forward for each school. Due to the policy that schools cannot “lose” a
schoolwide program once they have one, I then take the max of these low-income measures for
each school between 2001 and the lagged year in the dataset.
I merge this data with the publicly available Common Core of Data from the National
Education Center for Education Statistics (NCES)to get more information on each school. Namely,
I use the indicators in this dataset for both Title I status and whether the school runs a Targeted
Assistance Program or a Schoolwide Program. I drop any schools without Title I status, but as
these generally have very low FRL ratios, this does not materially affect my results either way.
For academic outcomes, I standardize the TAKS scores in math and reading by year and
grade. I also use the passing indicator in the data, though the threshold for passing varies by
subject, grade, and year. The test is given in grades 3-11 from 2003 through 2011. I control for
baseline scores throughout the paper, so this eliminates third graders and any exams from 2003.
Once the datasets are merged and only the students in schools within the 10% bandwidth
kept, I have a total sample of 2,138,719 students across 5,745 schools, about 370 students per
school sampled. As one can see in Table 2.1, there are more non-FRL students than FRL students
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due to the 40% threshold by school. The FRL ratio is certainly not equal across the threshold, but
this also follows directly from the research design. About two-thirds of the students in the sample
attend schools above the threshold, due to the distribution of FRL percentage by schools in the
sample. The students in schools above the threshold appear less likely to be white, and more likely
to be black or hispanic. Students in schools above the threshold score about .1 standard deviation
lower on both math and reading. This could be due to schoolwide program status or due to the
demographic composition.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Discontinuity / First Stage
Per the guidelines pertaining to schoolwide program provision in Title I schools, one should
see a discontinuity in the ratio of schools using a schoolwide program at the 40% low-income
threshold. I provide visual evidence for this in Figure 2.1, plotting the percentage of schools with
schoolwide programs by the percentage of low-income students in each school as well as a linear
approximation. One might expect a jump from zero to 100% at the cutoff, but for several reasons
this is not the case.
The principal reason for the smaller jump present in the figure is that schools are allowed to
use a measure other than free-and-reduced lunch count for their low-income count. They may use
Medicaid numbers, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) numbers, or Census data.
They may also use the low-income percentage from a feeder school. For example, a middle school
with 34% low-income students that receives students from an elementary school with 43% low-
income students may implement a schoolwide program. Lastly, schools above the 40% threshold
do not have to implement a schoolwide program; they may choose not to apply for one, preferring
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the targeted assistance program for one reason or another. As stated earlier, this is why the results
must be interpreted as the effect of the freedom of the school to choose different interventions than
those prescribed under Targeted Assistance Programs. For these reasons, the jump is not as sharp
as one might hope, but there is still a significant discontinuity present.
Table 2.5 provides the first-stage results corresponding to Figure 2.1 as part of the general
results. The figure includes both a linear spline specification and a quadratic spline specification.
For the purposes of the paper, I base my results off the linear specification, but results from various
bandwidths and polynomials are included in Tables 2.8 and 2.9. The coefficient for the linear
discontinuity is positive and significant in all specifications. Other specifications were done, with
similar results – only the preferred specifications are included. Schools with more than 40% FRL
students are about 17 percentage points more likely to have a schoolwide program than districts
below the threshold.
Though a larger discontinuity would allow us to see impacts more readily, it is just not
feasible in this case. There are several different methods of measurement districts are allowed to
use, as well as several exceptions. I believe those account for the small discontinuity. I did the
first stage analysis for several subsamples of schools to determine if there were one type of school
that complies more readily with the policy than others, and the 17 percentage point increase is
pretty constant across the subsamples. However, even with a smaller discontinuity than expected,
because of the size of the data set, the F-test value for the first stage is quite large, at about 39, well
above the generally accepted minimum value of 10 for a proper IV analysis.
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2.5.2 Tests of the validity of the RD design
Schools receive a constant marginal amount of federal Title I money per low-income stu-
dent around the threshold in question. Thus, they have an incentive to enroll as many students as
possible in the FRL program. This would not affect the distribution around the 40% threshold.
However, if school administrators believe a schoolwide program is beneficial, there might be a
second order incentive to push their school count above the cut-off. To assess this, I plot the distri-
bution of schools around the 40% cut-off in Figure 2.2. A discontinuity in the distribution would
mean that schools are manipulating the running variable, thus invalidating the research design [?].
In the figure, one can see a possible negative discontinuity at the threshold, which in this case is
not concerning. There is no reason for schools to want to drop below the 40% threshold, as there is
no discernible benefit from doing so. Being above the threshold allows for more freedom, and no
other policies are in place around the 40% number. I also formally complete a Mccrary test, finding
no significant discontinuity in the distribution around the threshold. For this test, I follow the gen-
eral Mccrary procedure, binning the counts by FRL ratio, constructing a fourth-order polynomial
on either side, and checking for a discontinuity at the 40% threshold. In this case, the discontinuity
is extremely small and insignificant. Results for this test are found in Table 2.2. Thus, I do not
believe there is precise control of the running variable.
Next, I check for differences in observable characteristics across the threshold, both at the
school level and at the student level, using the preferred specification with each covariate as the
outcome in a separate regression. This is found in Table 3.5. At the student level, I examine
the propensity to be white, black, hispanic, female, FRL status, English Language Learner status,
and special education status. At the school level, I examine the number of students, percentage
breakdowns for white, black, and hispanic students, and the student/teacher ratio. As previously
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mentioned, students above the threshold are more likely to be White, and less likely to be Hispanic.
Schools above the threshold show a similar pattern in their student bodies. Also, schools above
the threshold are about 50 students smaller than those below the threshold. The fact that several of
the coefficients in the table are significant is not ideal, and it is necessary to think through how this
might bias results. Based on correlations between race, student count, and test scores, it appears
that these would tend to bias the results upward.
I also check for differences in individual baselines student test scores for both math and
reading across the threshold, shown in Table 2.4. Baselines scores in this case are comprised of
student test scores from the prior year TAKS exam. Here, the numbers are not what one would
expect based solely on the demographics in the previous paragraphs. Students above the threshold
score 1% of a standard deviation lower in reading, and pass the math test at a 0.6% lower rate. This
differences are quite small, and most likely won’t impact the results much, but I do include baseline
math and reading scores in the main specifications for the analysis. Due to this, the coefficients in
question should be thought of as the effects on student growth, not student achievement levels.
2.5.3 Effects of Schoolwide Programs on Student Achievement
In the principal specification, I examine the impact on all students on both math and reading
exams of a schoolwide program. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show the reduced-form relationship between
low-income student percentage and achievement on both the math and reading tests. In math,
there appears to be a positive, though very small, discontinuity at the threshold. In reading, there
is an extremely small discontinuity, one that appears to almost not be present at all. Achievement
decreases as the percentage of low-income students within a school increases throughout the band-
width. This relationship does not appear to be of a higher order, leading me to control for a linear
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function with differing slopes on each side of the threshold in my preferred specification.
The corresponding estimates are found in Table 2.5, and show exactly how small the dis-
continuities in the figures are. The first column on each side of the table shows results for the
standardized score, while the second shows results for the passing rate. The first row shows the
IV estimate under all three specifications, while the second row shows the reduced form estimate
and the third the first stage estimate. These results come from my preferred specification, with
a linear spline on low-income ratio, and control for student demographics, school demographics,
and baseline test scores.
The reduced-form estimates are bounded around zero, with a minimum of -0.004 for the
math score, and a maximum of 0.001 for the reading scores. As one might expect, this leads to IV
estimates very close to zero as well. None of the four IV estimates are significant at the 10% level,
and the t-stat with the largest magnitude of the four is about -0.6. This is not due to large standard
errors but rather to extremely small coefficients. In all cases, the first stage is constant, and shows
a jump of 17.1 pp at the threshold in the probability of implementing a schoolwide program.
It is apparent from these results that, on average, using a schoolwide program over a tar-
geted assistance program has no impact whatsoever on test scores for either math or reading. How-
ever, due to the nature of the two programs, this could be possible due to varying effects across
groups canceling each other out, as the targeted assistance program targets specific students, while
the schoolwide program does not.
2.5.3.1 Results by FRL Status
While general test results are an important outcome for these programs, the nature of
schoolwide programs call for an investigation into how the the students targeted by the policy
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are impacted differentially. In the control state (a TAP), schools must use Title 1 money for at-
risk students. One approximation for this in the data is FRL status. In a schoolwide program, the
money can be used across the schools as general funds. Thus, I examine the impact of schoolwide
program on both FRL and non-FRL students for both tests using the specification described earlier
where I interact all the independent variables with FRL status, as well as include a variable for this
status. In this model, I allow both the discontinuity and the slopes to vary by FRL status. Non-FRL
students score much higher, about .4 standard deviations on each test, on average. This is true for
both tests. Results for this are found in Table 2.6.
Across the four outcomes and two groups, not one coefficient is significant. Moreover,
there is no discernible pattern where any type of conclusion might be drawn. Similarly to the
previous table, all the results are bunched quite tightly around zero. Not only does it appear that
there is not any type of impact on either group individually, but the results do not vary across
groups, as the policy might suggest. The bottom row shows a p-value from a test of equality of the
two coefficients displayed above. A low p-value would indicate that the two coefficients can be
rejected as equal, while a higher p-value would indicate that the two cannot be rejected as equal.
The p-value for these tests are given in the bottom row. The coefficients cannot be rejected as equal
for any of the four outcomes.
2.5.3.2 Results by Quartile
While the definition of targeted students is somewhat nebulous and is largely left up to the
schools, I also investigate potential impacts across groups by splitting the students into quartiles
based on baseline test scores. If schools are targeting the lowest-performing students, then one
would expect these students to do worse in a schoolwide program than in a targeted assistance
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program, while the higher-performing students would score higher. In Table 2.7, I interact each of
the independent variables with an indicator for each of the four quartiles, allowing for differential
analysis.
In math, there is no significant impact on the lower-performing students, but the highest
quartile actually performs worse in a schoolwide program than in a targeted assistance program.
Students in the fourth quartile show an impact of -0.086 standard deviations in test score and -0.033
percentage points lower in passing rate in a schoolwide program. This is the opposite of what one
might expect, and is difficult to explain.
In reading, the pattern is less clear. The fourth quartile students score 0.048 standard devi-
ations higher in a schoolwide program, but do not pass at a higher rate. There are two significant
coefficients among the reading estimates, and both only at the 10% level. Conclusions are tough to
come. Once again, in the bottom row of the table, I test for whether the estimates can be rejected
as equal. In this case, the impacts on reading score can be rejected as equal at the 10% level, but
the estimates for the other outcomes cannot.
2.5.3.3 Compliers
As in any instrumental variables model, it is important to think about which subjects fall
into the complier category, as opposed to the never-takers and the always-takers. In this case,
the never-takers are the schools who keep a targeted assistance program even though they are
above the 40% threshold. There are several possible reasons for this. They might believe that
the interventions required within a TAP are more beneficial than the alternative. They might not
want to go through the long application process for a schoolwide program. Always-takers are
much harder to figure out, though according to Figure (2.1) there are some schools well below
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the threshold that do indeed have schoolwide programs. They may be using a feeder school’s
low-income ratio or a different measure than FRL.
Compliers, then, are those schools who are using their own FRL percentage as their mea-
sure and who apply for a schoolwide program immediately at or above the 40% threshold. These
schools most likely have administrators who believe that they can do better by their students under
their own control of the Title I funds than they can under the required TAP interventions. They
may use the same interventions, but use the funds differently. They may have completely differ-
ent interventions than those required in TAPs, or they may integrate the funds into the general
school finance structure and not use any interventions at all. The important difference between
schools with TAPs and schools with SWPs among the complier category is the lifting of the re-
quired interventions. Thus, the results may be interpreted as more about school choice than about
the interventions themselves. Are students better off in schools where some of their educational
structure is dictated by Title I guidelines or in schools where their individual schools or districts
are free to structure the education as they see fit?
2.5.4 Sensitivity Analysis
In Tables 2.8 and 2.9, I examine the robustness of my results to several concerns regarding
the choice of specification for the regression discontinuity design on math and reading outcomes,
respectively. Each cell shows the 2SLS RD estimate of the effect of a schoolwide program on
achievement levels from a separate regression. The first column in each table shows the estimates
with no controls, while the second includes student-level covariates. In the third, I add school-
level covariates, and in the fourth, I add baseline test scores. The first row displays baseline 2SLS
estimates in which I use a bandwidth of 0.1 and a linear spline specification. The estimates from
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the preferred specification used throughout the paper are found in the first row and fourth column
for each outcome.
In rows 2 and 3, I check the sensitivity of my estimates to the chosen bandwidth of 0.1.
While the main analysis includes students in schools with a student body of between 30% and
50% FRL members, in row 2 I reduce the bandwidth to 0.05 and in row 3 I increase the bandwidth
to 0.2. The smaller bandwidth leads to larger estimates with even larger standard errors, using a
sample size of about half of the original. The larger bandwidth leads to more precise and smaller
estimates for math, while the estimates for reading are larger. The precision in this specification
is helpful, but it is hard to believe that schools at 20% FRL membership and those at 60% FRL
membership are similar enough for a true RD comparison. For math, none of the estimates using
these bandwidths are significant for any of the covariate groups included. For reading, using a
bandwidth of 0.2 gives significant negative estimates for a couple of the outcomes. Overall, it
looks like the bandwidth is not a factor in driving my results.
In the baseline model, I assume that the relationship between school FRL ratio and student
achievement levels is piecewise linear. The relationship is shown in Figures 2.3 and 2.4, and this
assumption looks correct. However, if it is not correct, my estimates may be biased in one direction
or the other. Thus, in rows 4 and 5, I run the model using a piecewise quadratic function (allowing
the slopes to differ across the threshold). In row 4, I do this at the original bandwidth of 0.1. The
estimates for math are very similar, though with much larger standard errors, while the estimates
for reading are again larger, though also with large standard errors. In row 5, I expand the sample
to a bandwidth of 0.2. These estimates for both math and reading are similar to those in the original
analysis, and the standard errors are of similar magnitude. Of the 32 coefficients across these two
rows between the two tables, one is significant at the 10% level. It appears that my polynomial
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specification, too, is not driving the results showing a complete lack of impact of the policy.
While the coefficients do vary somewhat by specification and bandwidth, none of the
changes are large enough to cause concern that the preferred specification is leading to biased
estimates. There are very few significant coefficients, and the magnitudes are all very small. The
estimates presented are indicative of the wider analysis, and not due to the preferred specification
only.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I examine the effects of schoolwide programs (versus targeted assistance
programs) on the achievement of both FRL and non-FRL students using a regression discontinuity
approach that exploits a policy in Title I, Part A determining school eligibility for these programs.
I find that schoolwide programs have no impact whatsoever on student achievement in both math
and reading. I examine whether the effects vary differentially across student groups, first analyzing
by FRL status and then by quartiles of academic achievement. The lack of any impact is constant
across groups, showing that it is not an average covering up more varied results.
Three possibilities arise from this. In one, schools eligible for a schoolwide program are
simply continuing the use of the same interventions as those in a targeted assistance program, or
at least of a generally similar nature. The other possibility is that schools below the threshold are
not following the guidelines with respect to the strings of the Title I funds, and thus the students
in question are not getting the interventions the policy mandates. There are reports due to ensure
that these interventions are occurring, so this would mean a lack of a good reporting system or
falsification of those reports. The last possibility is that schools on opposite sides are indeed
treating students differently, but that these differences have no impact on student achievement.
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The debate concerning the difference in educational achievement between socioeconomic
groups has grown in the educational realm, and few remedies have been found. Furthermore,
there has not been a causal study of the difference between the two program types on student
achievement. These results contribute to the debate by doing just that – using a plausible causal
analysis to examine how the program types effect students differentially. These results can also be
applied to a wider debate on whether education should be a local or a broader concern. Even though
the interventions mandated in a targeted assistance program are meant to help at-risk students, it
appears that they have no effect when compared to programs designed by the schools themselves.
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Tables
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Full Sample Below Threshold Above Threshold
Student
Female 0.496 0.494 0.497
White 0.528 0.580 0.498
Black 0.125 0.109 0.135
Hispanic 0.309 0.270 0.331
Spec. Ed 0.062 0.062 0.062
ESL 0.050 0.044 0.053
FRL 0.426 0.370 0.458
School
Female 0.487 0.486 0.488
White 0.517 0.569 0.487
Black 0.128 0.111 0.138
Hispanic 0.314 0.276 0.337
Spec. Ed 0.115 0.113 0.116
ESL 0.043 0.038 0.046
FRL 0.442 0.385 0.475
Student Count 947.862 930.937 957.604
Baselines
Baseline Math Score 0.106 0.159 0.076
Baseline Reading Score 0.133 0.183 0.104
Baseline Math Pass 0.800 0.816 0.791
Baseline Reading Pass 0.895 0.906 0.888
Students 2,138,719 781,321 1,357,398
Schools 5,745 2,130 3,615
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Notes: Estimates from formal McCrary test in which the optimal
bandwidth and bin size are determined using the data, after which the
data is binned, allowing for the estimation of a quartic on both sides
and the log of the discontinuity at the threshold.
*** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *
Significant at the 10% level.
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Table 2.3: Tests on Observables at Threshold


















Notes: All specifications clustered at school x year level. Each coef-
ficient and associated standard error comes from a separate regression
with a separate linear term on either side of the threshold and a dummy
for being above the threshold without other controls.
*** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *
Significant at the 10% level.
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Table 2.4: Tests on Baseline Scores at Threshold
Student Level School Level
Baseline Math Score -0.013 -0.006
(0.009) (0.010)
Baseline Reading Score -0.012∗∗ -0.004
(0.006) (0.007)
Baseline Math Pass -0.006∗ -0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
Baseline Reading Pass -0.002 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002)
Observations 2,138,719 5,745
Notes: All specifications clustered at school x year level. Each coef-
ficient and associated standard error comes from a separate regression
with a separate linear term on either side of the threshold and a dummy
for being above the threshold without other controls.
*** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *
Significant at the 10% level.
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Table 2.5: Estimates of Effect of Schoolwide Programs on Test Scores
Math Reading
Score Pass Rate Score Pass Rate
SWP -0.022 -0.004 0.007 -0.007
(0.036) (0.016) (0.024) (0.010)
Reduced Form -0.004 -0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
First Stage 0.171∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Student Controls X X X X
School Controls X X X X
Baseline Scores X X X X
N 2,138,719 2,138,719 2,138,719 2,138,719
Clusters 7,446 7,446 7,446 7,446
F-Test 38.970 38.970 38.970 38.970
Notes: All specifications clustered at school x year level. Each co-
efficient and associated standard error comes from a separate regres-
sion with a separate linear term on either side of the threshold and a
dummy for being above the threshold.
*** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *
Significant at the 10% level.
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Table 2.6: Differential Estimates by FRL Status
Math Reading
Score Pass Rate Score Pass Rate
SWP*Non-FRL -0.030 -0.010 0.013 -0.003
(0.035) (0.014) (0.024) (0.009)
SWP*FRL -0.002 0.007 0.001 -0.013
(0.041) (0.021) (0.031) (0.015)
Student Controls X X X X
School Controls X X X X
Baseline Scores X X X X
N 2,138,719 2,138,719 2,138,719 2,138,719
Clusters 7,446 7,446 7,446 7,446
P-value for equality 0.456 0.359 0.488 0.360
Notes: All specifications clustered at school x year level. Each coeffi-
cient estimated using a linear regression with separate dummies for FRL
and non-FRL students, allowing the slope to vary on each side. FRL is
also controlled for in these specifications. The p-value comes from a
test of equality of the two parameters in the table.
*** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Signif-
icant at the 10% level.
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Table 2.7: Differential Estimates by Quartile
Math Reading
Score Pass Rate Score Pass Rate
Quartile 1 0.024 0.033 0.016 -0.045
(0.056) (0.043) (0.055) (0.030)
Quartile 2 0.022 0.015 -0.050 -0.024∗
(0.050) (0.025) (0.035) (0.014)
Quartile 3 -0.021 -0.030∗∗ -0.004 0.005
(0.036) (0.015) (0.023) (0.008)
Quartile 4 -0.086∗∗ -0.033∗ 0.048∗ 0.013
(0.033) (0.018) (0.026) (0.009)
Student Controls X X X X
School Controls X X X X
Baseline Scores X X X X
N 2,138,719 2,138,719 2,138,719 2,138,719
Clusters 7,446 7,446 7,446 7,446
P-value for equality 0.139 0.349 0.089 0.113
Notes: All specifications clustered at school x year level. Each column
includes dummies by quartile, as well as the interaction of each covari-
ate with each of the quartiles.
*** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Signif-
icant at the 10% level.
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Table 2.8: Estimates on Math Test Scores
Scores Pass Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Baseline
SWP -0.001 -0.086 -0.078 -0.026 0.037 -0.019 -0.022 -0.006
(0.079) (0.061) (0.060) (0.036) (0.039) (0.022) (0.022) (0.016)
N 2,138,719 2,138,719 2,138,719 2,138,719 2,138,719 2,138,719 2,138,719 2,138,719
Bandwidth=.05
SWP -0.035 -0.229 -0.224 -0.113 0.029 -0.085 -0.089 -0.054
(0.184) (0.163) (0.148) (0.088) (0.090) (0.060) (0.057) (0.040)
N 1,149,178 1,149,178 1,149,178 1,149,178 1,149,178 1,149,178 1,149,178 1,149,178
Bandwidth=.2
SWP -0.007 -0.061 -0.051 -0.026 -0.006 -0.015 -0.016 -0.008
(0.050) (0.038) (0.037) (0.023) (0.024) (0.014) (0.014) (0.010)
N 3,762,090 3,762,090 3,762,090 3,762,090 3,762,090 3,762,090 3,762,090 3,762,090
Bandwidth=.1, quadratic
SWP -0.069 -0.292 -0.312 -0.158 0.053 -0.119 -0.130 -0.081
(0.261) (0.233) (0.213) (0.124) (0.127) (0.090) (0.085) (0.060)
N 2,138,719 2,138,719 2,138,719 2,138,719 2,138,719 2,138,719 2,138,719 2,138,719
Bandwidth=.2, quadratic
SWP -0.029 -0.115∗ -0.106 -0.043 0.025 -0.031 -0.034 -0.013
(0.090) (0.069) (0.067) (0.040) (0.044) (0.025) (0.025) (0.018)
N 3,762,090 3,762,090 3,762,090 3,762,090 3,762,090 3,762,090 3,762,090 3,762,090
Student Controls X X X X X X
School Controls X X X X
Baseline Score X X
Notes: All specifications clustered at school x year level. Each coefficient and associated standard error comes from a separate
regression with a separate linear term on either side of the threshold and a dummy for being above the threshold.
*** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table 2.9: Estimates on Reading Test Scores
Scores Pass Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Baseline
SWP 0.031 -0.046 -0.043 -0.001 -0.028 -0.016 -0.019 -0.008
(0.056) (0.040) (0.039) (0.025) (0.020) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010)
N 2,138,719 2,138,719 2,138,719 2,138,719 2,138,719 2,138,719 2,138,719 2,138,719
Bandwidth=.05
SWP 0.114 -0.037 -0.040 0.018 -0.003 -0.004 -0.012 0.002
(0.137) (0.094) (0.086) (0.056) (0.046) (0.029) (0.027) (0.023)
N 1,149,178 1,149,178 1,149,178 1,149,178 1,149,178 1,149,178 1,149,178 1,149,178
Bandwidth=.2
SWP -0.001 -0.051∗∗ -0.042∗ -0.010 -0.020∗ -0.009 -0.008 -0.000
(0.035) (0.026) (0.025) (0.016) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006)
N 3,762,090 3,762,090 3,762,090 3,762,090 3,762,090 3,762,090 3,762,090 3,762,090
Bandwidth=.1, quadratic
SWP 0.154 -0.029 -0.043 0.040 0.004 0.009 -0.001 0.020
(0.200) (0.128) (0.113) (0.075) (0.065) (0.040) (0.036) (0.032)
N 2,138,719 2,138,719 2,138,719 2,138,719 2,138,719 2,138,719 2,138,719 2,138,719
Bandwidth=.2, quadratic
SWP 0.012 -0.066 -0.062 -0.012 -0.031 -0.018 -0.021 -0.008
(0.064) (0.045) (0.044) (0.028) (0.023) (0.014) (0.014) (0.011)
N 3,762,090 3,762,090 3,762,090 3,762,090 3,762,090 3,762,090 3,762,090 3,762,090
Student Controls X X X X X X
School Controls X X X X
Baseline Score X X
Notes: All specifications clustered at school x year level. Each coefficient and associated standard error comes from a separate
regression with a separate linear term on either side of the threshold and a dummy for being above the threshold.
*** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Figures
Figure 2.1: First Stage
Figure 2.2: McCrary Test for Manipulation of Running Variable
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Billions for What? The Impact of Title 1 Money on Student
Achievement
3.1 Introduction
The federal government spends more than $14 billion per year on Title I funding to public
schools across the country. There are various levels of accountability that accompany this large
amount of money, but it is very difficult to calculate an estimate of the return on this spending.
Title I began in 1965 with the enactment of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
(ESEA), an act that largely redefined the federal government’s role in local education. A piece of
President Lyndon B. Johnson’s ”War on Poverty”, the law created a large source of funding to help
schools with high ratios of low-income children. ”In recognition of the special educational needs
of low-income families...the Congress hereby declares it to be the policy...to provide financial
assistance...to local educational agencies serving areas with concentrations of children from low-
income families” (Section 201, Elementary and Secondary School Act, 1965)
While different versions of the Elementary and Secondary School Act have been passed
by Congress throughout the years (most recently the Every Student Succeeds Act of 2015) with
varying amounts of strings attached, Title I funding has been a large source of school district
revenue since the original enactment in 1965. Since its inception, researchers have attempted to
determine how Title I funding has impacted student achievement, the original stated goal of the
81
program. This paper follows in this line of research, attempting to improve upon the previous
studies in the quest to determine the relationship between spending and student outcomes.
Hanushek (1997) reviews the literature with respect to the relationship between school
resources and student performance, concluding that ”simple resource policies hold little hope for
improving student outcomes.” Borman and D’Agostino (1996) review the literature with respect
to Title I more specifically, including 17 federal studies from 1966 to 1993, and find small positive
effects that have become larger over time, perhaps because of increased oversight. However, many
of the studies included in these meta-analyses cannot truly address the endogeneity of low-income
student concentrations with respect to test scores.
To overcome this endogeneity, recent papers have used the within-district threshold for Title
1 status in regression discontinuity designs (Van der Klaauw 2008, Matsudaira et al. 2012). Van
der Klaauw uses school-level data from New York City public schools to calculate the low-income
student ratio threshold the district uses each year to determine which schools receive Title I funding
and which do not. Matsudaira et al. use the same strategy for an unnamed urban school district,
also using school-level data. Neither study finds positive impacts of Title I funding on student
achievement, and Van der Klaauw actually finds negative impacts for two of his three study years.
Both of these papers show high internal validity, but as is the case with regression discontinuity
designs, suffer from a lack of external validity. Their estimates only apply to students in schools
very much like those within the school district in question and very close to the threshold within
that district for a given year.
In this paper, I attempt to answer the same question of Title I’s impact on student achieve-
ment, but for a much wider range of schools. The obvious added benefit here is increased external
validity – the results are much more applicable to students across the United States as a whole.
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Furthermore, I have student-level data available to me, allowing for the inclusion of student-level
covariates, increasing the sample size as well as the precision of my estimates. This level of data
allows me to determine the impact of Title I funding on student growth, instead of just achieve-
ment, and lets me split the data into subgroups for which one may expect to see different impacts
of Title I funding.
To achieve the aforementioned benefits, I have devised a strategy that allows for estimating
the impact of Title I funding on student achievement across my entire sample. The data available
is from public schools in Texas from the years 2004 through 2011. This is a large sample of very
different looking schools and students, and as such, an innovative methodology is necessary. I
exploit the funding provisions of Title I using an instrumental variables strategy. Each district
must rank their schools in terms of low-income student ratio, then allocate Title I funds from
the top down. There are exceptions, but in general schools lower in the district’s distribution
have a much lower probability of receiving Title I funding. I use each school’s percentile within
district as an instrument, conditional on district-by-year fixed effects, in an attempt to overcome
the endogeneity present as well as take advantage of the large data set available. If each school’s
percentile within district-by-year grouping impacts student achievement only through Title I status,
then this instrument is valid and my results are causal. However, in performing the analysis, I find
that the instrument violates the exclusion restriction, and as such, the estimates are not causal, and
may only be thought of as a correlative lower bound.
That the estimates presented represent correlative lower bounds comes from Nevo and
Rosen [2012], in which the authors build on several previous papers to determine that under certain
conditions, imperfect instruments may be helpful in providing bounds for point estimates rather
than being thrown out altogether. In this case, several assumptions are met, and because the esti-
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mates from a simple OLS model are less than those in the IV model, the IV point estimates are
lower bounds on the true point estimates.
I find that a school being designated as Title I increases Title I funding an average of $309
per student, and that this is not accompanied with an increase or decrease in state or other federal
funding. However, when looking at funding by school level, I find only a significant increase in
Title I funding per student among middle schools, not elementary or high schools. Along with that
increase in funding, I find an increase in math passing rates of 2.9 percentage points and no change
in reading passing rates. I see no overall impact on standardized score in either math or reading.
As lower bounds, this simply informs that Title I money does not have a negative impact on scores,
but does have a positive impact on math passing rates.
I then split the sample by low-income student status, school level, and student quartile
(per previous year’s scores). I find that Title I funding may decrease passing rates and scores
among elementary school students, regardless of low-income status. On the other hand, I find
large, though insignificant, impacts on both math and reading exams for middle school students,
particularly those who are low-income or in the lower two quartiles of the test score distribution.
I see no impact among high school students, though this is likely due to a very weak first stage at
this level.
One might hope, given the total amount of federal expenditures on the Title I program, to
see better returns than those detailed above. However, there is evidence of large, positive effects
among the middle school students at whom the program is most targeted. More investigation is
necessary to determine why such effects are found among middle school students in contrast to
those found among elementary school students. Lastly, while I cannot currently devise a method
to solve the lack of adherence to the exclusion restriction in this paper, it may be possible with
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more ingenuity.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the funding guide-
lines for the Title I program and Section 3 introduces the data and research design. Section 4
presents estimates of the impact of Title I funding on student achievement and Section 5 discusses
the implications of these findings.
3.2 Institutional Background
Title I was originally signed by Lyndon B. Johnson in 1965 as part of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act (ESEA) (Pub. L. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27, 20 U.S.C. ch. 70). Since 1965, it
has been the largest source of federal government funding for K-12 education. In 2011, more than
$14 billion of federal spending was allocated to Title I, and currently more than 50% of public
schools receive public funding. Titled “Better Schooling for Educationally Deprived Children”,
its purpose was to give financial assistance to local educational agencies with high amounts of
low-income children. The thought was that these students, being low-income themselves, who
attended schools with other low-income students, had a much more difficult path to success than
their educational peers.
In order to determine which schools receive Title I, Part A funds, a district must follow
detailed guidelines. The focus of this paper is on larger districts, as smaller districts (those with
fewer than 1,000 students) can choose to serve any or all of their campuses with Title I funds. In
larger districts, a campus is eligible to receive Title I, Part A funds if the percentage of low-income
students residing in the attendance area is equal to or greater than that of the district as a whole.
Campuses with greater than 75% poverty must be served first. After that consideration, districts
must rank their campuses in terms of low-income percentage and then serve the campuses from
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the top down. This ranking serves as the method of identification in this paper. However, there are
many exceptions, which may explain why the instrument used is not perfect.
First, districts may choose to rank order within grade span rather than as an entire district.
These are very clearly correlated, and thus, for simplicity’s sake, I will use district-wide ranking.
Secondly, a district may not serve any campus that has a low-income ratio of less than 35%. Lastly,
a district may choose to serve any ineligible campus that was eligible last year for one additional
transition year.
In terms of how these exceptions impact my analysis, they do not bias my results. They
describe more who falls into the complier and non-complier category, and how to interpret the
results. The school districts without exceptions will fall into the complier category, and the results
will describe the impact of the additional funding in these districts.
In terms of how much money to allocate, a district does not have to allocate the same
amount per child for each campus. However, a district may not allocate more per child to a campus
with a lower poverty rate than to a campus with a higher poverty rate. The amount varies by state,
by district, and by school, and thus, there is no one single amount.
3.3 Data and Research Design
My analysis is based upon data from the Texas Educational Resource Center (ERC), in-
cluding student-level demographic, attendance, and test score data. The demographic files contain
information on age, gender, free or reduced lunch (FRL) status, ethnicity, special education status,
English as a second language (ESL) status, limited English proficiency (LEP) status, and gifted
and talented status (GT). The attendance files contain information on enrollment for each student
86
across each school year, including if and when a student may have transferred mid-year.
The test score data is from the Texas Assessment of Knowledge and Skills (TAKS) exams,
developed by Pearson, and conducted in the springs of third grade through eleventh grade. Students
are tested in both math and reading every year. All public school students are required to take the
TAKS exams unless they have a severe disability. Those with moderate disabilities are given
accommodations, but still take the exams. In my analysis, the test scores are normalized to have
a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one for each grade, subject, and year across the entire
Texas sample. For simplicity’s sake, I focus on the math and reading exams.
Students were matched across these files both cross-sectionally and longitudinally using
de-identified student ID numbers. Using the fall enrollment dates and the testing dates, I then
constructed school-level variables, including gender, ethnicity, FRL, special education, ESL, LEP,
and gifted/talented ratios. These variables are used as additional controls throughout the analysis.
I match this data with the school-level data set that includes an indicator for whether a
school is a Title I school. I use the school outlay data set and collapse the school expenditures
down by source of funding, so that I have amounts spent by each school each year using Title I
funding, state funding, and other federal funding. After merging the data, I divide these amounts by
the student counts to create a per capita Title I spending variable, a per capita state funds spending
variable, and a per capital total spending variable.
Finally, I construct a district-level low-income ratio and rank schools by low-income ra-
tio within district and year. I use this rank to generate a percentile, which will be used as the
conditional instrument for analysis.
I then restrict the schools per the various guidelines pertaining to which schools are eligible
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to receive Title I funding. I exclude any schools from small districts due to their many exemptions.
Schools with student bodies below 35% low-income are not eligible and schools with student
bodies above 75% low-income are guaranteed funding, so I include only schools within these two
thresholds. Lastly, schools with student populations below the district low-income ratio are not
eligible, so I exclude them as well. After one more exclusion I explain in detail in the next section,
the sample remaining includes 1,054,283 students in 2,122 campus-by-year groups.
As seen in Table 3.1, my resulting sample is somewhat similar to that of Texas as a whole
during the period. My sample has more low-income students but less of both gifted and special
education students. As one of the principal contributions of this paper is the external validity as
compared to earlier work, it is important that this sample be representative of the wider student
population as a whole.
3.3.1 Research Design
The purpose of this paper is to determine the impact that Title I funding has on student
achievement. Ordinary least squares is fraught with issues, as Title I funding is given to schools
with high poverty ratios, and high poverty is strongly correlated with lower performance on exams.
I demonstrate the relationship between Title I designation and a school’s poverty ratio in Figure
3.1. This type of analysis would not be causal, and would be very negatively biased. To overcome
this endogeneity, I exploit a funding provision with an instrumental variables approach.
As stated earlier, Title I designations and funding at the school level are decided by district
administrators. They rank their schools in terms of low-income student ratios, and then must apply
the Title I designation from the top down. This allows me to use school rank within district as an
instrument for Title I funding, conditional on school and student characteristics. I operationalize
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this rank by constructing a percentile for each school of their free-and-reduced lunch ratio within
each district by year group.
In the first stage, as detailed here,
TitleIsdt =α + β1f(Percentile)sdt +Xisdtpi + Zstγ +Ddtη + ist (3.1)
I estimate the impact of the school’s percentile within district on the probability of receiving
Title I funding, conditional on school and student characteristics and district-by-year fixed effects.
This is for student i in school s in district d in year t. X is a vector of student characteristics,
including gender, race, grade, free-and-reduced-lunch status, gifted status, special education status,
English as a secondary language status, and previous year’s math and reading standardized scores.
Z is a vector of school-level characteristics, including ratios for gender, race, free-and-reduced
lunch, special education, English as a secondary language, and student body count. D is a vector
of district-by-year fixed effects, and  is the error term. The coefficient of interest is β1, which
measures the increase in probability of Title I designation corresponding to an increase in the
school’s percentile within district-by-year group.
In the second stage,
yisdt =α + β2T̂ itleIsdt +Xisdtpi + Zstγ +Ddtη + ist (3.2)
,
I exclude the percentile variable, but include the predicted probability of Title I funding
estimated in the first stage. All other controls are the same, and the coefficient of interest is β2.
This coefficient measures the impact of Title I funding on my outcomes, which include probability
89
of passing math and reading exams and standardized scores on both. All estimates in both stages
are clustered at the school-by-year level, the level of treatment.
3.3.2 Instrument Validity
In order for the research design to be considered causal, it must satisfy the two main as-
sumptions of an instrumental variables design: relevance and the exclusion restriction. The first
piece is easier to show. In Figure 3.2, I group schools into bins by their percentile of low-income
ratio within the appropriate district-by-year group and display the means of Title I probability for
each of those bins. The simple relationship shown is very strong and positive. In Table 3.2, I
display the coefficient from Equation 3.1 using a variety of covariates at the school-by-year level.
The first model, with simple district-by-year fixed effects, shows a very strong relationship be-
tween percentile and Title I probability. However, this model ignores school demographics as well
as the school’s FRL ratio, and most likely violates the exclusion restriction. The second column
includes FRL ratio, and percentile is no longer relevant to Title I probability.
This is likely because district-by-year fixed effects and a school’s FRL ratio together com-
pletely determine a school’s percentile within district. Columns three and four correspond to one
and two, but include a vector of school demographics. Column three is my preferred specification
going forward. While I would like to include the school’s FRL ratio, the instrument is no longer
strong enough once I do so in column 4.
A school’s percentile within district and FRL ratio are closely related, and I cannot include
both, as shown in column 4. However, when I drop FRL ratio, one might worry about violating
the exclusion restriction. For this not to be a worry, I need to use districts in which the schools
have very similar FRL ratios. Then the percentile is informative as to Title I designation, but not to
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the school’s demographic composition. In Figure 3.4, I plot each district’s variance of school FRL
ratios over its overall FRL ratio, weighted by the number of students in the district. There does
not appear to be any relationship present, so excluding districts with large within-district variances
should not pose any problem.
The next question is how to cut the sample. In Figure 3.5, I cut the sample four times
and plot the first stage coefficient for each of them. The first sample includes schools in districts
with variance in only the first quartile of district variances, the second sample includes schools in
districts with variances below the median, the third sample includes schools in districts in the first
three quartiles, and the last sample is all schools. In Figure 3.6, I plot the coefficients for each of
the four outcomes by the same four samples. In each of these, it seems that the smallest and largest
samples have estimates much different from the rest.
The smallest sample lacks precision due to the size, and is small enough to impact external
validity. The largest sample, which includes districts with large within variances, is most impacted
by the exclusion of the FRL ratio as a covariate. For the remainder of the paper, I use the third
sample, in which I exclude schools in districts in the top quartile of the within-district variance
measure. This sample leaves enough students for precise estimates and external validity, but does
not suffer from a violation of the exclusion restriction as much as the complete sample.
In Table 3.3, I replicate Table 3.2, but at the student level. Column five here is similar to
column three in the previous table, but includes a vector of student-level covariates. Using column
five as the preferred specification, it appears that a 10 percentage point increase in a school’s
percentile of FRL ratio within district increases the school’s probability of receiving Title I funding
by 8.38 percentage points.
91
In Table 3.4, I show the IV estimate of Title I designation on federal Title I money per stu-
dent, state money per student, and total spending per student minus Title I in separate regressions.
Column 3 shows the results from the preferred specification, and it appears that a Title I designation
increases Title I funding per student by $309. Some evidence for the exclusion restriction is shown
in the second and third column, in that Title I schools do not receive differing amounts of state
or total non-Title I funding per student. The point estimates here are positive, but with very large
standard errors, which is most likely because these sources of funding are determined by a large
variety of outside factors for which this study cannot control. The first column in this table shows
why the simplest model is not valid. Without controlling for student and school characteristics, a
school’s percentile is highly correlated with factors that determine other sources of funding.
In Table 3.5, I regress the model separately on each student covariate as an outcome. Unfor-
tunately, while none of the coefficients on individual gender or race are significant, a 10% increase
in percentile corresponds with a .24 pp decrease in likelihood of being an ESL student, a 1.3 pp
increase in likelihood of being a low-income student, and a 0.3 pp decrease in being a special ed-
ucation student. The most worrisome of all of these is the high magnitude and significance level
of the FRL variable. This points to the idea that the instrument, even with restricting the sample
on variance, is not accounting for all the difference in FRL ratios between schools. This obvi-
ously violates the exclusion principle, and as such, the results discussed hereafter must be taken as
correlative more than causal.
In fact, following the thought process set out in Nevo and Rosen [2012], the instrumental
variable estimates presented in this papers may be thought of as lower bounds for the true estimates.
Under three assumptions, the authors show that in this case, the true point estimates are equal to
or greater than the minimum of the OLS estimates and the IV estimates. These assumptions all
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hold, starting with A1: random sampling. A2 states that the imperfect instrument Z is correlated
with the unobservable U, but that it is less so than the endogenous regressor X. In this case, that
means that a school’s percentile within district, conditional on district-by-year fixed effects, is less
correlated with U than whether or not the school receives Title I money. Finally, A3 states that the
correlations between the instrument and the error term and the endogenous regressor and the error
term are both positive or both negative. In this case, both are negative. Thus, all three assumptions
hold, which means that we can apply Lemma 1. In this case, that states that because the correlation
between a school’s percentile and its Title I status is positive, then because the correlation between
Title I status and the error term are negative, β ≥ max{βOLS, βIVz }. In this case, the OLS estimates
are all below the IV estimates, and thus, the IV estimates presented here may be thought of as lower
bounds on the true beta.
Because the coefficients arising from IV models are local average treatment effects (LATE),
it is necessary to discuss to which schools and districts the estimates in this paper apply. The ad-
vantage of this research design over an RD design is the external validity. In the RD design papers,
the estimates only speak to schools right around the thresholds in the given district. However, in
this research design, the estimates only speak to districts that follow the rules without many ex-
ceptions. Due to the explicit exceptions, this includes schools in districts with more than 1,000
students that have a low-income student ratio of greater than 35% but less than 75% and higher
than the district average. The nationwide average falls just above 50%, so these schools are some-
what centered around the national average. In general, the LATE in this case applies to schools in
non-small districts who are neither very high nor very low in low-income students.
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3.4 Results
Due to the lack of compliance with the exclusion restriction, but with the assistance of Nevo
and Rosen [2012], it is important to remember that the results shown in the paper present lower
bounds on the true point estimates. The impact of Title I funding on student achievement is shown
for all students in Table 3.6. I compute the impact of the funding for four different outcomes, math
and reading passing rates and math and reading standardized scores. These impacts are shown in
the first row. A Title I designation increases a student’s probability of passing the math exam by 2.9
percentage points, from a baseline of about 76%. There is no effect on math scores, however. On
the reading exam, there is no impact on either passing rates or scores due to a Title I designation.
The second row shows the first stage, which is the same for all outcomes. As lower bounds, these
zeroes simply show that Title I money does not have a negative impact on testing outcomes, but
does have a significant, positive impact on math passing rates.
In Table 3.7, I show the same results, but with the amount of Title I money as the first
stage outcome. In this case, the first stage estimate is 0.259, which means that a 10% increase in
percentile leads to $25.9 more Title I dollars per student. However, the first stage in this case is not
strong enough, with an F-stat of only 7.1. As a consequence, while the coefficients on the second
stage are perhaps larger, the standard errors are too.
Both tables show average impacts only, and as Title I is designed to assist specific groups
of students, it is necessary to dig deeper. Because of this, I examine the results by various levels
of heterogeneity, including low-income status, school level, and student quartile. In the rest of this




Table 3.8 displays results split by free-and-reduced lunch status. In each column, I interact
percentile with both outcomes of an FRL dummy variable as instruments for the Title I indicator
interacted with both outcomes of the FRL dummy variable. I do not interact all the controls, but do
include the individual’s FRL status as a covariate. In math, it appears that Title I funding benefits
the low-income students, though not at the expense of the non low-income students. Low-income
students in Title I schools pass the math exams at a rate of 6.7 pp higher than their non Title I
peers. The difference in standardized score is .03σ, though not significant. Low-income students
in Title I schools pass reading exams at a rate of 2 pp lower than their non-Title I peers, and score
slightly worse, though again, not significantly so. It appears that a Title I designation increases
performance on the math test for low-income students, and does not have a negative impact on
reading scores, while not negatively impacting the non low-income students. It is possible that
Title I money even increases scores for these students, as these are lower bounds.
3.4.1.2 School Level
The disparate results between math and reading are not solved by splitting across FRL
status, but there is a much clearer pattern when splitting the impacts by school level. In Table
3.9, I split the sample into elementary schools, middle schools, and high schools per the Texas
Education Agency’s designations. The far right column details the amount of additional money
schools in each level receive per student when designated Title I. For both elementary and middle
schools, it appears they may receive more money, but the standard errors are too large for statistical
significance. The magnitude increase for elementary schools due to Title I designation is $391 per
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student, and for middle schools it is $225 per student.. The point estimate on high schools is quite
high, at at additional $1,365 per student, but the standard errors for all the high school outcomes
are quite high. The first stage for high schools is not very precise, which leads to imprecise second
stage estimates. I believe this is because high school Title I designations are more prone to using
exceptions mentioned in Section 2, which are too numerous to detail again here.
In the first row, it is clear that a Title I designation at the elementary level hurts both scores
and passing rates. Scores of elementary school students in Title I schools are 0.37σ lower in
math and 0.27σ lower in reading, while passing rates are 0.03 pp lower in math and 0.17 lower in
reading. Even as lower bounds, these impacts are quite large in magnitude. These schools do not
receive less money, so there might be something about the designation itself that is causing these
scores to be lower.
The middle school results show a different story. Students in Title I middle schools pass
math at a rate 8 pp higher and reading at a rate of 15 pp higher than those in non-Title I middle
schools. Middle school Title I students score almost 0.4σ higher in math and .26σ in reading,
though again, none of these estimates are significant at even the 10% level. However, these are
also very large impacts, and more investigation into how Title I money is implemented at the
elementary school and middle school levels is necessary.
3.4.1.3 Quartiles
In order to determine if the Title I money is helping the students most in need of interven-
tion, I split the students into quartiles based on their previous year’s scores. Before paring down
the sample, I average each student’s standardized scores across math and reading, then split the
students into quartiles based on this average.
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Once again, the pattern in math is much more clear than the pattern in reading. Title I
students in the lower two quartiles perform much better than their peers in non-Title I schools in
math, and this comes at the expense of the students in the upper two quartiles. In the first quartile,
students in Title I schools pass at rates 24 pp higher than their peers and score 0.09σ higher. Second
quartile students show similar, strong impacts, with coefficients of 19 pp and 0.18σ. However,
students above the median are harmed in terms of math scores by Title I status. Third quartile
students in Title I schools pass math exams at a rate of 10 pp lower than their peers, while fourth
quartile students pass at a rate of 19 pp lower than their peers and score 0.22σ lower. If Title I
funding is meant to help lower-performing students, it certainly hits the mark in math exams, but
at the expense of the higher-performing students.
However, in reading, this same pattern does not hold. While the estimates for first quartile
students show at worst a modest negative impact on reading performance, both second and third
quartile students are harmed by Title I money. Second quartile students in Title I schools pass
reading exams at a rate at worst 4 pp lower and score 0.07σ lower than their peers, while third
quartile students in Title I schools score at worst 0.06σ lower, though there is no impact on their
passing rates. Oddly enough, fourth quartile students seem to benefit from Title I designation, with
those in Title I schools scoring .08σ higher than those outside of such schools.
It appears that in math, Title I funding increases test scores for low-income or low-performing
students at the expense of the non low-income or high-performing students. The positive effects
are shown mostly at the middle school level. However, in reading, both non low-income and low-
income students show lower scores in Title I schools, and this impact occurs mostly in the middle
of the distribution. Unfortunately, this pattern is tough to decipher, and in tables not shown here,
I estimate impacts by the interaction of school level, prior performance, and low-income designa-
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tion. These tables yield no more information.
3.5 Discussion
The federal government spends over $14 billion per year on the Title I program in hopes
of assisting schools with high concentrations of low-income students. However, conclusions as to
the impacts of this money are lacking. While there have been many reports and various research
studies attempting to determine the program’s effects, most cannot overcome issues related to the
strong relationship between low-income concentration and test scores. Authors that have been able
to overcome this issue as of late have used a regression discontinuity design, writing papers with
high internal validity that suffer from weak external validity. The instrumental variable design of
this paper allows me to use a sample from across the state of Texas, greatly increasing the external
validity. However, the internal validity of this paper is not nearly as high as those previous, and
estimates within should be regarded as more correlative than causal.
Title I funding does not have consistent impacts for math and reading, nor does it have con-
sistent impacts across heterogeneous student groupings. Overall, the funding appears to increase
math passing rates, with no impact on reading passing rates nor on standardized scores on either
test. The impacts in math are highly dependent on previous scores. Students who scored below the
median the previous year show large increases in passing rates and scores, while students above
the median show large decreases in both outcomes. In reading, there is a slight negative impact
on both passing rates and scores, but not significant among almost any group. The one group
shown to have decreased performance on reading exams due to Title I designation is those in the
second quartile. While the estimates presented represent lower bounds on the true point estimates,
the large magnitude of the negative estimates for these students cannot rule out true negative esti-
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mates. These results cannot speak to which level of school most effectively uses Title I funds, as
the sample size is simply not large enough. Furthermore, the instrument used is not strong enough
to estimate impacts among high schools.
Without knowing exactly how Title I funding is used in schools, it is difficult to dive into
these results much more. It is possible that in middle schools, where students are much less closely
tied to particular teachers, more money is easily used. As to why extra funding can be linked to
negative outcomes, perhaps there is some type of stigma associated with a Title I designation that
affects the student or teacher sample. However, as these estimates are lower bounds, the negative
estimates may not be closely tied to the true point estimates.
The results shown indicate that funding may be working as advertised in middle schools.
The point estimates are quite large among middle school students, though not significant. It is
important to determine the mechanism for these types of impacts. If such an investigation can
lead to a deeper understanding of how schools can use additional money to best impact student
achievement, students all over will benefit, and the large amounts of money spent on public schools
in the United States can be put to use more productively.
Tables & Figures
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics









English as Second Language 0.07 0.06
(0.25) (0.23)








Table 3.2: First Stage Estimates – School Level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Percentile 1.389*** 0.236 1.095*** 0.198
(0.105) (0.187) (0.123) (0.181)
N 2,122 2,122 2,122 2,122
Mean .701 .701 .701 .701
F-stat 173.8 1.6 79.1 1.2
District-by-Year FE X X X X
School demographics X X
FRL Ratio X X
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the campus level.
Table 3.3: First Stage Estimates – Student Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Percentile 1.511*** 0.307* 0.992*** 0.298* 0.838*** 0.067
(0.101) (0.166) (0.116) (0.159) (0.112) (0.158)
N 1,054,283 1,054,283 1,054,283 1,054,283 1,054,283 1,054,283
Mean .611 .611 .611 .611 .611 .611
F-stat 225.8 3.4 73.6 3.5 56.0 0.2
District-by-Year FE X X X X X X
School demographics X X X X
Student demographics X X
FRL Ratio X X X
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors
clustered at the campus level.
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Table 3.4: Impact on $ Per Capita ($1000s)
(1) (2) (3)
Impact on Title I $ Per Capita
Title I Status 0.321*** 0.263* 0.309*
(0.079) (0.150) (0.177)
Mean 0.354 0.354 0.354
Impact on State $ Per Capita
Title I Status 1.353*** 0.397 0.932
(0.398) (0.722) (0.834)
Mean 6.818 6.818 6.818
Impact on All Non Title I $ Per Capita
Title I Status 2.273** 0.723 1.936
(1.051) (1.952) (2.299)
Mean 9.902 9.902 9.902
First Stage 1.511*** 0.992*** 0.838***
(0.101) (0.116) (0.112)
N 1,054,283 1,054,283 1,054,283
District-by-Year FE X X X
School demographics X X
Student demographics X
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Standard errors clustered at the campus-by-year level.
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Table 3.5: Impact of Instrument on Observables
Female White Black Hispanic
Percentile 0.007 0.005 0.002 0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Mean 0.495 0.323 0.199 0.423
ESL FRL Gifted Special Ed
Percentile -0.024*** 0.132*** 0.011* -0.030***
(0.004) (0.015) (0.006) (0.010)
Mean 0.059 0.548 0.081 0.064
N 1,054,283 1,054,283 1,054,283 1,054,283
School demographics X X X X
District-by-Year FE X X X X
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p <
0.01. Standard errors clustered at the campus-by-year level.
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Table 3.6: Main Results
Math Reading
Pass Score Pass Score
Title I Receipt 0.029** 0.016 -0.011 0.004
(0.015) (0.033) (0.009) (0.021)
First Stage 0.838*** 0.838*** 0.838*** 0.838***
(0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112)
N 1,054,283 1,054,283 1,054,283 1,054,283
Mean 0.762 -0.016 0.849 0.014
First Stage F-stat 56.0 56.0 56.0 56.0
Student demographics X X X X
School demographics X X X X
District-by-Year FE X X X X
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p <
0.01. Standard errors clustered at the campus-by-year level.
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Table 3.7: Main Results Using Title 1 Money as First Stage
Math Reading
Pass Score Pass Score
Title I Money ($1000s) 0.095 0.050 -0.034 0.011
(0.060) (0.111) (0.034) (0.067)
First Stage 0.259*** 0.259*** 0.259*** 0.259***
(0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097)
N 1,054,283 1,054,283 1,054,283 1,054,283
Mean 0.762 -0.016 0.849 0.014
First Stage F-stat 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1
Student demographics X X X X
School demographics X X X X
District-by-Year FE X X X X
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p <
0.01. Standard errors clustered at the campus-by-year level.
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Table 3.8: Estimates by FRL Status
Math Reading
Pass Score Pass Score
Title I Receipt * FRL 0.067*** 0.028 -0.020* -0.023
(0.017) (0.034) (0.011) (0.024)
Title I Receipt * Not FRL -0.014 -0.002 -0.000 0.033
(0.016) (0.035) (0.011) (0.023)
N 1,054,283 1,054,283 1,054,283 1,054,283
Mean 0.762 -0.016 0.849 0.014
Student demographics X X X X
School demographics X X X X
District-by-Year FE X X X X
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Standard errors clustered at the campus-by-year level.
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Table 3.9: Estimates by School Level
Math Reading Title I $$
Pass Score Pass Score Per Capita
Title I Receipt * Elementary -0.027 -0.372 -0.170 -0.265 0.391
(0.096) (0.276) (0.111) (0.178) (0.292)
Title I Receipt * Middle 0.082 0.394 0.151 0.263 0.225
(0.133) (0.368) (0.154) (0.234) (0.379)
Title I Receipt * High -0.634 -1.724 -0.787 -1.087 1.365
(1.679) (4.546) (2.011) (2.931) (3.769)
N 1,054,283 1,054,283 1,054,283 1,054,283 1,054,283
Mean 0.762 -0.016 0.849 0.014 0.354
Student demographics X X X X X
School demographics X X X X X
District-by-Year FE X X X X X
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors
clustered at the campus-by-year level.
107
Table 3.10: Estimates by Prior Student Performance
Math Reading
Pass Score Pass Score
Title I Receipt * 1st Quartile 0.237*** 0.086* -0.042 0.066
(0.047) (0.048) (0.028) (0.042)
Title I Receipt * 2nd Quartile 0.185*** 0.180*** -0.044*** -0.065***
(0.035) (0.050) (0.015) (0.032)
Title I Receipt * 3rd Quartile -0.104*** 0.027 0.012 -0.056*
(0.025) (0.037) (0.013) (0.030)
Title I Receipt * 4th Quartile -0.193*** -0.222*** 0.022 0.075*
(0.043) (0.056) (0.017) (0.041)
N 1,054,283 1,054,283 1,054,283 1,054,283
Mean 0.762 -0.016 0.849 0.014
Student demographics X X X X
School demographics X X X X
District-by-Year FE X X X X
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Standard errors clustered at the campus-by-year level.
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Figure 3.1: Title I Probability by FRL Ratio
Notes: The figure shows the mean probability of Title I designation by the low-income ratio at
the school.
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Figure 3.2: Title I Probability by Percentile within District
Notes: The figure shows the mean probability of Title I designation by the school’s percentile
within district with respect to FRL ratio.
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Figure 3.3: Percentile within District by FRL Ratio
Notes: The figure shows the mean percentile of school FRL ratio within district by the low-
income ratio at the school.
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Figure 3.4: Within-District FRL Variance by District FRL Mean
Notes: The figure shows the within-district variance in low-income percentage across schools
over the mean low-income percentage within the district, weighted by the number of students
in the district.
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Figure 3.5: First Stage Estimates by Sample
Notes: The figure shows the first stage estimate and 95% confidence interval across four dif-
ferent samples.
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Figure 3.6: Main Estimates by Sample
Notes: The figure shows the principal results for the four outcomes and corresponding 95%
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Notes: For each year and subject, the number indicated is the
percentage of students that must pass the exam in order for the
school to have met its standard. The passing score for each stu-

































































































































































































































































































Table A3: Sample Restrictions
Restriction N Campuses N Race x Campus Groups N Students
Have Math and Reading Scores 52,474 146,037 16,820,061
& Not AYP Exempt 50,689 141,585 16,446,768
& Grade ≤ 8 42,854 120,904 13,952,455
& Count ≥ 150 36,349 103,867 13,370,364
& Within Bandwidth of 5 915 4,821 239,464
Notes: Beginning sample includes students in grades 3-8 and 10 from public schools in Texas
from 2004-2011 for whom there is enrollment and testing data.
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Table A4: Results by Sample
Math Reading
Pass Score Pass Score
All Grades, All Student Counts, Bandwidth=5
Subgroup Qualifies 1.25*** 0.033*** 1.08*** 0.032***
(0.41) (0.009) (0.34) (0.008)
385,056 385,056 385,056 385,056
≤8th Grade, All Student Counts, Bandwidth=5
Subgroup Qualifies 1.23*** 0.036*** 1.04*** 0.034***
(0.45) (0.011) (0.32) (0.009)
292,827 292,827 292,827 292,827
≤8th Grade, Student Count ≥150, Bandwidth=5
Subgroup Qualifies 1.17** 0.032*** 1.39*** 0.034***
(0.50) (0.012) (0.36) (0.010)
239,464 239,464 239,464 239,464
Student demographics X X X X
School demographics X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Notes: Each result is from a separate regression with a linear function of the count on each side
of the threshold, allowing the slope to vary on either side. Regressions are done using different
samples of students described in the left-most column, and include gender, race, FRL status,
special education status, and LEP status at the student level, as well as gender, FRL, special
education, LEP, and student count at the school level, as indicated. All regressions include
school-by-race fixed effects.
*** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table A5: Tests on Observables
Panel A: Demographics
Male FRL Special Ed ESL Gifted At Risk
Student-level
Subgroup Qualifies 0.46 0.93 -0.57 -0.99 -0.38 0.22
(0.47) (1.58) (0.42) (1.23) (0.66) (1.10)
Mean 50.31 57.27 8.22 9.61 8.24 38.16
N 239,464 239,464 239,464 239,464 239,464 239,464
# Clusters 4,821 4,821 4,821 4,821 4,821 4,821
School-level
Subgroup Qualifies 0.02 -0.52 -0.20 0.23 -0.65 -0.56
(0.19) (1.73) (0.26) (0.47) (0.54) (1.16)
Mean 51.22 52.53 11.18 6.34 9.27 39.41
N 239,464 239,464 239,464 239,464 239,464 239,464
# Clusters 4,821 4,821 4,821 4,821 4,821 4,821
Panel B: Prior Year Scores
Math Reading
Pass Score Pass Score
Subgroup Qualifies -0.05 0.016 0.23 0.01
(0.56) (0.014) (0.43) (0.013)
Mean 81.91 -0.801 88.51 -0.018
N 167,253 167,253 167,253 167,253
Clusters 4,795 4,795 4,795 4,795
Notes: Each result is from a separate regression with a linear function of the count on each
side of the threshold, allowing the slope to vary on either side. The results presented are from
regressions without control variables apart from the linear spline.
*** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table A6: Placebo Threshold Effects
Math Reading
Pass Score Pass Score
Threshold at 35 -0.45 -0.015 -0.32 -0.004
(0.49) (0.012) (0.37) (0.011)
N 211,444 211,444 211,444 211,444
Threshold at 40 -0.09 -0.004 -0.47 0.001
(0.51) (0.011) (0.36) (0.010)
N 220,347 220,347 220,347 220,347
Threshold at 45 0.35 0.018 0.49 0.023**
(0.46) (0.011) (0.33) (0.009)
N 233,837 233,837 233,837 233,837
Threshold at 50 1.17** 0.032*** 1.34*** 0.034***
(0.50) (0.012) (0.36) (0.010)
N 239,464 239,464 239,464 239,464
Threshold at 55 0.12 -0.001 0.09 -0.007
(0.51) (0.012) (0.36) (0.010)
N 242,995 242,995 242,995 242,995
Threshold at 60 0.21 0.017 -0.10 0.004
(0.53) (0.013) (0.37) (0.010)
N 243,755 243,755 243,755 243,755
Threshold at 65 -0.01 0.010 0.579 0.023**
(0.53) (0.013) (0.37) (0.010)
N 247,580 247,580 247,580 247,580
Notes: Each result is from a separate regression with a linear function of the count on each side
of the threshold indicated, allowing the slope to vary on either side. All regressions include
year, grade, and school-by-race fixed effects, gender, race, FRL status, special education status,
and LEP status at the student level, as well as gender, FRL, special education, LEP, and student
count at the school level.

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure A1: Spring Treatment as a Function of Fall Counts
Notes: The figure shows the probability of official spring treatment as a function of the fall
count of students by subgroup. Only students enrolled in the fall qualify as a member of the
subgroup in the spring.
124
Figure A2: Individual Covariates as a Function of Subgroup Count
Notes: Each panel shows the mean value of the given covariate by the distance from the thresh-
old, as well as the predicted values generated by the default regression specification described
in the text.
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Figure A3: School Covariates as a Function of Subgroup Count
Notes: Each panel shows the mean value of the given covariate by the distance from the thresh-
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